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4Before the Law   
 
Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there comes a man from the country and prays for 
admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance at the moment. The man 
thinks it over and then asks if he will be allowed in later. "It is possible," says the doorkeeper, "but not at the 
moment." Since the gate stands open, as usual, and the doorkeeper steps to one side, the man stoops to peer 
through the gateway into the interior. Observing that, the doorkeeper laughs and says: "If you are so drawn 
to it, just try to go in despite my veto. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the least of the 
doorkeepers. From hall to hall there is one doorkeeper after another, each more powerful than the last. The 
third doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I cannot bear to look at him." These are difficulties the man 
from the country has not expected; the Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all times and to 
everyone, but as he now takes a closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, with his big sharp nose and 
long, thin, black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait until he gets permission to enter. The 
doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets him sit down at one side of the door. There he sits for days and years. 
He makes many attempts to be admitted, and wearies the doorkeeper by his importunity. The doorkeeper 
frequently has little interviews with him, asking him questions about his home and many other things, but 
the questions are put indifferently, as great lords put them, and always finish with the statement that he 
cannot be let in yet. The man, who has furnished himself with many things for his journey, sacrifices all he 
has, however valuable, to bribe the doorkeeper. The doorkeeper accepts everything, but always with the 
remark: "I am only taking it to keep you from thinking you have omitted anything." During these many 
years the man fixes his attention almost continuously on the doorkeeper. He forgets the other doorkeepers, 
and this first one seems to him the sole obstacle preventing access to the Law. He curses his bad luck, in his 
early years boldly and loudly; later, as he grows old, he only grumbles to himself. He becomes childish, and 
since in his yearlong contemplation of the doorkeeper he has come to know even the fleas in his fur collar, 
he begs the fleas as well to help him and to change the doorkeeper's mind. At length his eyesight begins to 
fail, and he does not know whether the world is really darker or whether his eyes are only deceiving him. Yet 
in his darkness he is now aware of a radiance that streams inextinguishably from the gateway of the Law. 
Now he has not very long to live. Before he dies, all his experiences in these long years gather themselves in 
his head to one point, a question he has not yet asked the doorkeeper. He waves him nearer, since he can no 
longer raise his stiffening body. The doorkeeper has to bend low toward him, for the difference in height 
between them has altered much to the man's disadvantage. "What do you want to know now?" asks the 
doorkeeper; "you are insatiable." "Everyone strives to reach the Law," says the man, "so how does it happen 
that for all these many years no one but myself has ever begged for admittance?" The doorkeeper recognizes 
that the man has reached his end, and, to let his failing senses catch the words, roars in his ear: "No one else 
could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut it."     
 -Franz Kafka 
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Although born in Prague under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and dying 
before Stalin took control of the USSR, Kafka clairvoyantly understood the full 
paradox of Soviet authoritarianism.  His short parable “Before the Law” provides 
an interesting intellectual exercise for anyone wishing to study Soviet law, for in 
Russia it evokes tragic truth.  The man who futilely attempted to reach the law is 
a metaphor for Russian masses seeking the same goal.  Just as the doorkeeper 
with his air of conscious superiority and vacillating temperament mirrors the 
nature of Soviet rulers. The absurdity that underpins Kafka’s work poignantly 
and painfully parallels the arbitrary ‘justice’ of Stalin’s rule.  The man’s futile 
search is symbolic of the many purge victims who, while wasting away in the 
gulags, clung to the slim hope of using legal means to exonerate themselves.  
Through an intellectual and visceral response, Kafka conveys the authoritarian 
split between the elite and the masses in Russia.  No one knows how many 
countless Russian and Soviet citizens’ lives were wasted in the same shadow of 
indifferent omnipotence.  And we are forced to ask why the law was kept from 
them.  And yet, what fueled the insatiable pursuit of the law in the face of certain 
futility?  Even the Purges took place within a legal framework, as perverse as it 
may have been. But was Communist legality simply an oxymoron, or was there 
something more?  
6For contemporary Russia, the parable asks whether legality can ever take 
hold.  Was the door made only for them and if so has it been shut forever? Since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union countless scholars have questioned the nature of 
Russian ‘civil society’ and the extent to which Soviet (and now Russian) power 
was based in the rule of law.  They invariably answer that Russia has a weak civil 
society and that the rule of law has yet to take hold. 
And yet, only in late 2002 did Russian post-Communist authorities finally 
approve a comprehensive redaction of Russian Criminal, Civil and Labor laws 
and codes.  The previous codes, which still had the force of law in the eleven years 
after the collapse, were the same laws that had governed the Soviet State since 
1958.  Though moderately reformed and amended in the final years of Soviet 
authority, the corpus of the laws remained unchanged.  In a country where trial 
by jury was non-existent, where the assumption of innocence for the accused was 
never guaranteed and where the burden of proof fell on no one in particular, why 
had Russian authorities taken so long to reform their criminal justice system?  
Civil order had clearly not devolved into anarchy. What was it about the nature of 
the previous Soviet laws that made legal reform practically an afterthought in 
Russia’s post-Communist reform program?  The roots of this study of Russian 
legality and public order grew from this question. 
In 1958 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union passed into law the ‘Fundamentals of Criminal Law and Criminal 
Procedures for the USSR’. Two years later each constituent republic of the USSR 
passed similar law codes (e.g. Russian SSR Criminal Law Code).   The reformed 
laws reflected the general ‘thaw’ that Soviet society experienced after Stalin’s 
7death and the ascension of Khrushchev (1955-1964).   The new codes removed 
many of the more insidious aspects of the earlier codes, written in 1926 but 
amended under Stalin.  In the wake of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech to the 20th 
Party Congress in 1956, Soviet society briefly flourished and these legal reforms 
in many ways constituted the hallmarks of Khrushchev’s reforms.  They 
dramatically altered the nature of law in the Soviet state.  However, the fact even 
these once radical law codes so desperately needed reforming raises questions 
about the nature of Soviet society and Soviet authority at the time.  The roots of 
that situation invariably lead back to the formation of the Soviet Union and the 
Communist Party. 
 The 1917 Russian Revolution marked a dramatic and decisive break with 
the Russian past.  Recognizing the importance of legality in the construction of 
the state-citizen relationship and population’s collective identity, the Bolsheviks 
repealed Czarist legal codes as early as 1918 and replaced them with law codes of 
their own. However, despite exhaustive efforts the Party could not erase a 
millennium of legal development. This development consistently played an 
interesting sideshow to the development of Russian central political authority-- 
whether Czarist or Soviet --and the development of a Russian “state”.  As eminent 
Russian Legal Scholar W.E. Butler notes,  
“law is not merely the statue book at any given moment of time; it 
represents an accumulation of historical experiences, values, 
terminology, attitudes constructed in the course of human 
affairs…which cannot be wholly dispensed…[no matter] how drastic 
a revolution it may undergo.”1
1W.E.Butler. SovietLaw .(StonehamMA:ButterworthLegalPublishers,1983).10
8Even today discussion and debate abound about the development of a Russian 
“civil society” or a law based society, with legal restrictions applicable both to the 
population at large and the government itself. In fact, this theme is not a new one 
but has been constantly negotiated throughout the history of Russian legality.   
From its roots as the Kievan Rus proto state to the fall of the USSR, the role of 
law in Russia constantly changed and with it the definition of “Russia” as a State 
and the “Russians” as a people.  Using Butler’s definition, law then defines the 
extent and nature of the citizen-state relationship and in many ways 
demonstrates the underpinnings of the populations’ shared identity.  Therefore, 
examining the legal foundations and precedents throughout Russian history 
provides a broader context --both practically and conceptually-- for the reforms 
of late 1950s and early 1960s, which this paper will examine in great detail later.  
And this context will hopefully provide a more objective prism through which to 
view Russian and Soviet legality than the common Anglo-American 
preconception of legality and justice.   
 Unlike the Anglo Saxon conception of law, which perceives legality as an a
priori intrinsic entity applicable to both the citizens and the state, Russian 
legality contains no such universal claims. Given its authoritarian past, scholars 
generally perceived Russian law as synonymous with will of the state (or 
autocrat). Thus, overarching question of Russian legality then becomes, as noted 
Russian and Soviet legal scholar Jane Burbank puts it, “What role has “law” both 
9as a projected ideal and a means of governance played in the extended and 
traumatic evolution of Russian state organization…?”.2
Ultimately, no historian can reduce law or legality to their intrinsic 
qualities.  Soviet criminal law played a tremendous role in maintaining public 
order and defined the expectations the state placed on the citizens and vice versa. 
At the most fundamental level, the legal reform changed the nature of the 
relationship between the Soviet state and citizens.  In spite of the character of the 
authoritarian state, this relationship in the USSR was symbiotic and fluid. The 
state and society interacted in various ways.  Although not a political voice, 
society did indeed possess a voice through various social and anti social 
maneuvers. Job performance, commonplace civil disobedience, mass disorders, 
and general attitudes were the means through which Soviet society expressed its 
collective opinions. Ultimately, for better or worse, any ‘state’ is always 
responsive to its population.  In post Stalin USSR, the population voiced strong 
opinions over the nature of civil order.  This voice, shaped by various historical 
contingencies, created a unique social situation that ultimately necessitated 
major legal reform. 
By the 1950s, Stalinism as a means of governance was increasingly failing 
to maintain public order.  The horrific extent of the Purges of the late thirties 
(1936-1938) became increasingly clear. Family members of Purge victims began 
to demand why their loved ones had yet to return from their twenty-year 
sentences which had come to term. This problem was compounded by the fact 
2JaneBurbank.“ LegalCulture,Citizenship,andPeasantJurisprudence:PerspectivesFromtheEarly
TwentiethCentury .” ReformingJustice inRussia,1864 -1996.Ed.PeterH.Solomon,Jr.(New
York:M.E.Sharpe,Inc.,1997).83.
10
that local authorities had lost control of the gulags.  To make matters worse for 
Soviet authorities, Stalin’s death and the revelations from the gulags caused a 
massive identity crisis throughout the Soviet Union.  It was difficult, if not 
impossible, for many in the USSR to believe in the extent of Stalin’s crimes.  The 
state was practically forged in his image; such revelations shook the very 
foundations of the Soviet populations’ shared identity. 
Further compounding this problem was a near ubiquitous breakdown of 
civil order.  Hooliganism among the orphaned youth of the Second World War, 
which was fuelled by the return of criminal elements from the gulags, had created 
a widespread criminal subculture that threatened public order across the country.  
It seemed as if the Soviet authorities had failed to inculcate youth (though 
certainly not all) with Communist ideology.  The staggering extent of the hooligan 
problem was a clear message to the authorities.  But it wasn’t merely a 
manifestation of social opposition to the regime.  On the contrary, the majority of 
the pleas from the public were at large to rein in the hooligan problem and bring 
order back to the streets.  The Party could no longer use Stalinist means, as the 
gulags and the streets were in disarray, not to mention that Soviet politicians --as 
Stalin’s Terror had shaken them -- could not abide a return to a terror state. 
 To that end, this paper argues that the Legal reforms of the late fifties and 
early sixties  --the reform of the Procurators office, reform of the Soviet Criminal 
Law Code and Criminal Procedures, and various related reforms which sought to 
activate the public and create link between the legal system and the population -- 
were a direct response to this “crisis of authority” and “crisis of identity.”  These 
reforms constituted a quasi social-contract between the Soviet state and its 
11
citizens via liberalization and standardization of criminal and civil law codes.  The 
Party engaged the public in its own policing, and brought order to the streets 
without resorting to harsh penalties and an omnipotent police force as a 
deterrent. The reforms attempted to restore legitimacy and faith in the Soviet 
system, while maintaining one party rule.  
 Scholars outside of the legal profession have for the most part neglected  to 
discuss the legal reforms in a wider context.  Robert Service sums up the general 
attitude towards the reform like this: “The people, however, had only a brief walk 
on role in the drama”.  While hinting at unrest in society at the time, he 
ultimately interprets Khrushchev’s reforms as the elite’s “consolidation of their 
positions of power as individuals and to preserve the compound of the Soviet 
order.” 3 In the same vein, Dimitri Volkogonov argued that, 
“Stalin’s heirs were untroubled by the fact that there were more 
than four million people in the camps, that entire nations had been 
deported, and that the ‘punitive organs’ were still keeping a close 
eye on everyone…they were more concerned with their own fate, 
how to protect their own careers, and above all their personal 
security.”4
Undoubtedly, there’s some truth to Service’s and Volkogonov’s arguments, but 
they seem to fall prey to “oversimplified assumptions about the nature of 
authoritarian states.”5 Likewise, if their assumptions about the nature of party 
rule were relevant, they still fail to account for why Khrushchev would threaten 
3 RobertService. AHistoryofTwentiethCenturyRussia .(CambridgeMA:
HarvardUniversityPress,1998)331.
4 DimitriVolkogonov. AutopsyforanEmpire:SevenL eadersWhoBuiltthe
SovietRegime .(NewYork:TheFreePress,1998)243
5 VladimirA.Kozlov. MassUprisingsintheUSSR:ProtestandRebellioninthe
Post-StalinYears .(Aramonk,NY:M.E.SharpeInc.,2002)7
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his own position as Party leader by revealing the crimes and inhumanities of 
Stalin’s rule.    
Robert Conquest, one of the first Soviet scholars to write on the nature of 
the Khrushchev’s legal reforms, concluded that the reforms were “a self-imposed 
task of transforming Soviet society” and that the Soviet law would inherently 
“stop well short of the establishment of any rule of law.”6 However, Conquest’s 
insistence on the omnipotence of Party power fails to account for the social 
factors that contributed to, if not necessitated, these legal reforms.  On the other 
hand, Professor of Comparative Law, W.E. Butler, who complied the most 
comprehensive discussion of Soviet legality, left out any discussion on nature of 
the reforms and instead focused only on the nature of the Soviet legal system as a 
whole.  Peter H. Juvlier took the same approach in his work, Revolutionary 
Legality. While examining the legal reforms in great depth, they fail to account 
for precisely why the legal reforms took place.    
 Literary Scholar, Vera Dunham presents the most intriguing and relevant 
argument regarding the citizen-state relationship in the USSR.  In her work, In 
Stalin’s Time: Middle Class Values in Soviet Fiction, Dunham discusses the “tacit 
concordat” of positive controls which supplanted Stalin’s terror in the post-war 
USSR.  She maintains that the emerging Soviet ‘middle class’  -- a class of skilled 
workers socially above the common laborer but below the party and cultural 
elites -- demanded and received policies of “mediation, concession, internal 
alliances and conflict resolution.” This phenomenon, known as the “Big Deal”, 
6 RobertConquest. TheGreatTerror:ARea ssessment.(NewYork:Oxford
UniversityPress,1990)143.
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lasted from the end of the War to the Stalin’s death and explains much more 
thoroughly than the studies noted above the complexity of the citizen-state 
relationship in the Soviet Union.7 Party officials needed to maintain the loyalty of 
large swath of the population, whether through carrot or stick.  Few scholars of 
Soviet legality take into account this relationship.  For many, law exists in it an 
isolated state and its applications and implications go no further than the 
courtroom.  The implications of Dunham’s argument underpin this study of legal 
reform in the late fifties and early sixties.  However the social factors of the post 
Stalin years necessitated a far different “tacit concordat” than the early post war 
years.  The positive controls, which Dunham argues began to take shape before 
Stalin’s death, were vastly expanded and solidified in law as a concession to the 
Soviet people. In response to various “crises” in USSR society, the Party reined in 
its own arbitrary powers and devolved some of its coercive methods to more 
informal popular organizations.     
* * *
Before delving into the nature of the society and the legal reforms, it’s 
necessary to briefly discuss the nature of the sources used for this study. First, the 
Soviet press serves as a major primary source for this paper.  Neizvestnyi Gulag 
(a Russian language document collection) compilations of legal codes, a new 
monograph on mass uprisings in the USSR in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
(based completely on recently declassified archival material), and Khrushchev’s 
memoirs constitute the majority of the sources used. Of these, the newspapers 
7
VeraDunham. InStalin’sTime:MiddleClassValuesinSovietFiction .(DurhamNC:DukeUniversity
Press:1990)3 -6
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and memoirs seem most dubious. Memoirs give an intimate and interesting 
glimpse into thier author’s psyche, not only for what they chose to reflect upon, 
but perhaps even more for what they do not. Leaders often suffer from selective 
memory or an overwhelming desire to justify or pass blame. Ultimately, memoirs 
are far too one-sided to be used alone.  In the same way, the Soviet press presents 
difficulties for scholars. The modern phenomenon of “mass culture” developed in 
the USSR alongside industrial development and expansion.  Given the nature of 
state control in the USSR, the Party played an enormous role in the creation of 
and characteristics of Soviet mass culture.  As the literal mouthpiece of the 
Communist Party and Soviet government the major newspapers were both a 
source of information and the main propaganda tool.   The Party was unabashed 
in its propagandizing almost all aspects of information in the newspaper.  In fact, 
the main nationwide newspaper, Pravda, was officially an organ of the 
information service of the Communist’s Party’s Central Committee while 
Izvestiya was the organ of the Supreme Soviet – the main organ of the central 
Soviet government.  The problem for scholars is in how to analyze the 
information provided in these papers.  It would be folly to dismiss them outright, 
as they provide invaluable insights into the party’s goals and concerns.  As mouth 
pieces, the issues they focused on represent in one way or another the Party’s 
primary concerns about the population.  Thus it is necessary to ‘read between the 
lines’.  For example, if the papers constantly discuss the need to fulfill production 
goals, then it can be inferred that, not only was the Party deeply concerned with 
economic implications of plan fulfillment, but that there may well have been a 
problem with factories not meeting these goals. This logic does not hold up in all 
15
cases, but in conjunction with archival materials and government documents the 
newspapers reflect not merely the party’s goals, but its reaction to society.   
Secondly, much of the discussion on the extent of the hooligan problem 
and mass disorders in the time leading up to the legal reforms comes from 
Vladimir Kozlov’s monograph, Mass Uprisings in the USSR. Kozlov’s research 
exclusively draws from the Russian Federation State Archive, and as such his 
figures  and accounts of the uprisings are as reliable as possible as they are based 
on recently declassified top secret material.  The figures and accounts from the 
gulag were drawn from two Russian language works: Gulag: Glavnoe Upravlenie 
Lagerei 1918-1960 Dokumenti and Neizvestnyi GULAG: Dokumenti i Fakti . The 
rest of the primary sources are translated legal codes and case studies.   
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Chapter One 
Krugovaia Poruka: Collective Responsibility and the Development of 
Russian Legality.
“No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only 
for you” 
-Kafka 
The vastness of the Russian empire (and later, the USSR) limited the 
extent to which law could successfully govern. The central judicial 
administration’s size consistently seemed to fall far short of size of the empire 
itself.  Thus numerous isolated communities were forced to rely on customary law 
to supplant Moscow’s proclaimed precedence.  This inherent tension between 
localization and centralization with respect to the administration of justice should 
be kept in mind throughout the following discussion of Russian law. 
 * * *
For Western scholars, especially those in the United States and Great 
Britain, the historical and psychological gap between the “West” and this “other” 
Europe presents a daunting challenge to a clear understanding of Russian 
history. Thus in the study of Russian legality the most decisive moment is also 
one of the most decisive in Russian history in general; that is, Prince Vladimir’s 
decision to convert the Kiev Rus to Eastern Christianity in 988.  This decision set 
Russia on a divergent historical course that has only just approached convergence 
17
with the West in the 21st century. Since Eastern Christianity allowed its adherents 
to receive the gospel in the vernacular, the conversion to Eastern Christianity 
initially led to Cyril’s and Methodus’ codification of the Russian language.  This 
created the means to “reduce to written form the enactment of the princes or the 
customary rules applied” and set the stage for the acceptance of Canon law as the 
primary legal force outside the autocrat’s court.8 Even at this early stage of state 
development, Kievan Rus demonstrated a keen awareness of legality, as legal 
texts constitute virtually all of the few surviving texts from this time period.9 And 
while still debated by historians, there is strong suggestion that the Kievan legal 
texts simply presented in written form the customary codes which the Slavic 
peoples in that area had “fashioned for inter-personal and inter-clan behavior 
long before the Kievan princes consolidated power.”10 
This type of organic customary law constitutes the initial foundations of 
Russian law.  The earliest surviving collection of Russian laws, the Pravda 
Russkaia composed under Iaroslav the Wise (1015-54), primarily deals with 
criminal and civil issues like stealing, interest, suits for money, slavery and 
ownership.11 The Russkaia Pravda suggests that, “the prince’s court played only 
a minor role in prosecution and litigation, [and that] the system relied [solely] 
upon popular initiative of suits, as there as no system of courts, or legal 
profession.”12 
8
Butler,11.
9
Ibid,10.
10
Ibid,11.
11
Ibid,11.
12
Ibid,11.
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However, as the power of the Russian state and autocracy increased, so to 
did the authoritarian nature of the legal system. The Mongolian Horde first 
introduced autocratic government to the Russian landmass in the 13th Century.  
Using their overwhelming military force, the Mongols imposed a tributary state 
on the Russians.  While local authorities were allowed to run day-to-day 
government, the Mongols demanded large tributes form them on pain of swift 
and severe retribution. This “left and indelible imprint on subsequent Russian 
styles of State leadership.”13 Throughout the Mongol period (1240-1480) the 
Pravda Russkaia remained the dominant legal canon.  However, the Book of the 
Pilot, Kormchaia Kniga, a collection of Canon law, epistles, sermons, excerpts 
from Byzantine Law, Princely dictates, and selections from the Pravda Russkaia,
formed the core of civil law in Russian territory.  The Kormchaia played an 
important role in Russian life all the way to the 1917 Revolution, as it defined 
citizens’ obligations and rights with respect to “marriage, divorce, and family 
life.”14 
When the Russian territories emerged from the Mongolian Yoke, Moscow 
gradually established itself as the seat of central power.  As the Muscovy Princes 
consolidated their power, they issued charters defining the nature of their 
authority over the acquired areas.15 As a major component of the Princes’ 
authority, many of these charters defined the “judicial procedures and penalties, ” 
such as the Beloozero Charter of 1488.16 Later, the first national law code, the 
Sudebnik of 1497 and later 1550, established a hierarchy of courts and judges and 
13
Ibid,11.
14
I bid,12.
15
Ibid,14.
16
Ibid,14.
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expanded the rules governing judicial procedure. Remarkably, litigation under 
the Sudebnik appears to have been available to the entire spectrum of society: 
from prince to slave. Like modern court proceedings, the Sudebnik established a 
dual adversary system, which relied on witness testimony and evidence.  Also, it 
appears that the right to appeal was available and frequently exercised.  
However, the development of Law until the period of Alexander I and 
Nicholas I reigns is really the history absolutist ascension. The most dramatic 
period of development before Alexander II ’s Reform of 1864 took place under 
Czar Aleksei Mikhailovich, the father of Peter the Great, between 1648 and 1650. 
As the Russian empire was beginning to take shape, the large amount of legal 
codes then on record were consolidated and updated to ease the strain on the 
central authorities.  This resulted in the 967-article Sobornoe Ulozhenie, which 
finalized the enserfment of the peasantry and is thus widely regarded as the 
defining document of Russia’s transition to absolutism.  At the same time, the 
effects of the Treaty of Westphalia reached Russia.  The recognition of state 
sovereignty not only strengthened the Czars’ grip on power, but also furthered 
the development of Russia’s ethnic identity. And with Peter the Great ’s 
ascension, Russia turned her gaze even further westward. Russian legality 
became more entrenched in absolutism, as the law increasingly became a organ 
of state domination.  For example, In 1722 Peter established the Procuracy “to act 
as the eye of the Czar and watch over the conformity to the law of actions of local 
officials and bodies.”17 But at the same time, Peter was responsible for the 
founding of the Academy of Sciences, in which law was first studied in Russia. 
17
Ibid,18.
20
From this point on, the legal profession finally gained recognition among the 
Russian elite.   
Legal reform continued in varying degrees until the dramatic 10th 
codification under Czar Alexander I. While initially looking towards European 
sources, this comprehensive redaction ultimately found favor with the Czar when 
it “looked to Russia’s own historical experience and legislation to fashion a new 
law code.”18 Published in 1830 and widely distributed, the Polnoe sobranie 
zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii marked the first time a full record of Russian law was 
available across the empire.  At the same time, a legal digest of current legislation 
and decrees began to be published, and this digest continued until the 
Revolution.19 Although these publications marked the ascendance of legal and 
legislative professionalism in Russia and the beginning of the ‘golden age of 
Russian law’, they paradoxically underscored Russia’s Kafkaesque legal 
development; that is, hitherto the law had indeed been inaccessible to the 
majority of the civil servants, officials and public.  And as a result, the extensive 
judicial bribery and corruption (the natural result of the seemingly legal anarchy)  
a fostered a deeply negative perception of lawyers and judges under Peter I, 
Catherine II, Alexander I, and Nicholas I.20 
Shortly after these reforms, Alexander II took an even more drastic step in 
reforming Russian law.  The emancipation of serfs in 1861 and the judiciary 
reforms of 1864 drastically changed the course of both the Russian social fabric 
and the role of law.  The reform movements granted the peasantry with greater 
18
Ibid,20.
19
Ibid,21.
20
Ibid,22.
21
involvement in self-government, and the judiciary reform formalized the legal 
profession and separated the administrative and judicial organs.21 However, this 
self-determination was in many ways tantamount to legal segregation.  The 
judicial reform of 1864 established a separate court system for the peasantry, in 
the form of the volost courts that operated upon customary, unwritten law.  
Peasants for neighboring jurisdictions could “initiate legal proceedings in local 
courts, presided over by three locally chosen judges and decided on basis of both 
tradition and state rules.”22 
Historians continue to debate the meaning and consequences of this 
evolution.  Some, like Moshe Lewin, suggest that the volost courts were an 
‘invitation’ for rural population to participate in a ‘state created framework’ for 
legal process. However, rather than reflecting a emancipatory attitude towards 
the peasantry, Lewin suggests that since the peasantry was “not allowed to work 
out a full fledged system” the bifurcated legal process underscored the elitism and 
hierarchical attitudes of Russia reformers23 On the other hand, some scholars 
argue that contemporary scholars who disdain the peasant customary law system, 
simply perpetuate the same elitist biases. These scholars further argue that the 
peasant court system’s formal structure shared many commonalities with the 
supposedly more advanced “official” courts. Noted scholar Cathy Frierson 
demonstrated that “the volost court operation…was full of formality: the 
presentation of a complaint, the identification of witnesses, the duplicate copies 
of summons, and –at the trial itself- the judges seated behind a table covered 
21
Burbank,86.
22
Burbank,85 -86.
23
Lewin,Moshe,ascitedinBurbank,88.
22
with green cloth, recording and reading of the sentence.”24 Jane Burbank furthers 
this argument by demonstrating that the problems generally associated with 
volost courts, such as illiteracy, uncouth behaviors, and lack of education, were as 
apparent in official courts as they were in the volost courts. Ultimately these 
scholars attempt to “recast the idea of legal culture by shifting the definition away 
from knowledge [of legal process and statutes] to process [in general], away from 
knowing the law to accepting, using and respecting legal opportunities.”25 What 
they seem to agree on is the concept of law a powerful force in social engineering; 
that is, its ability to control citizens actions, to foster a specific worldview and 
collective identity, and to more completely draw the citizenry into contemporary 
social and political realities.   
The rise of formal legality and a professional legal class presented the first 
challenge to Czarist authority.  Indeed, many reformers saw law as an 
appropriate means to fundamentally change the Russian state, and some openly 
opposed the Czar’s authority in court. Many Czarist officials who attained high 
office in the late Imperial period sought to “abridge the independence of the 
judiciary….and in the last two decades of the nineteenth century legal officials in 
the State Council resisted [these] attempts to eliminate the jury system or restore 
administrative control of the courts.”26 Unfortunately, these reforms did not 
become firmly rooted in the Russian legal mindset.  But the quest for legality 
remained firmly imbedded in the psyche of most reformers and radicals.  Indeed, 
Lenin himself, recognizing the value of law as a force for social and political 
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change, studied law at Kazan state.  All of this set the stage for a drafting of a 
remarkably advanced criminal and civil law codes by 1913.  Although formally 
repealed after the Revolution, early Soviet legal codes drew heavily the 1913 
codes.27 
That’s not to suggest that Soviet legality maintained, at least theoretically, 
many of the predominant ideas of Czarist legality.   While an in depth discussion 
of the workings of the Soviet legal system exceeds the scope of this paper, the 
main tenets of so-called “socialist legality” must be elucidated. As the 
philosophical underpinnings of the Marxism-Leninism should be familiar to this 
paper’s audience, it should simply be noted that these ideals were basic training 
for all Soviet jurists.  Basically, they considered law as the will of the state and 
therefore the will of the ruling class.  This economic interpretation viewed law as 
merely a tool of the state.  In a proletarian dictatorship, law was a transitory 
necessity. Eventually, law as a formal institution would wither away with the rest 
of the state.28 This particular notion of law segued neatly with the historical 
development of Russian legality; that is, in some ways the Party simply 
supplanted the Czar as the final arbiter of justice. However, Soviet justice 
maintained some of the legacy of Czarist times, namely, a clearly defined line 
between the role of administrative organs and the courts independence.  As P.I 
Stuchka declared: “Any proletarian revolution begins with the smashing of 
Montesquieu’s theory of the division of power.”29 
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This problem aside, early Soviet experts on jurisprudence, such as P.I. 
Stuchka, E.B. Pashikanis, I. Kozlovsky and A. Goikhbarg, created a sophisticated 
and concise legal framework for Soviet Law. In fact, some of their pioneering 
ideas on criminal legality outside the political realm eventually found their way 
into Western legal systems. For example, examining the “personality of the 
criminal insofar as it will help explain the commission of the crime and its 
motives.”30 That is, Soviet legality considered society as a cause of crime and 
tailored its decisions accordingly. The State considered criminal justice a 
“defensive measure”. Of course, these distinctions arose from the fact that in 
destroying the Czarist state order, the Soviets also destroyed the prevailing social 
order.31 Thus their concern for legality reflected a crisis of authority across the 
political and social spectrum.  In the Decree on Courts issued shortly after the 
revolution, the Supreme Soviet dictated that,  
“New courts should be guided in their decisions and sentences by 
the laws of the overthrown governments only insofar as those laws 
have not been abrogated by the Revolution and do not contradict 
revolutionary conscience and revolutionary legal conscience.”32 
Although seemingly nihilist, this decree underscores the Bolsheviks’ prevailing 
concern for legality and further demonstrates their recognition that law and 
legality were necessary components in the creation of a new collective social 
consciousness.  
Although proclaiming pure Marxist lineage, the Soviet legal system 
remained rooted in Imperial Russian legal development. While the 1917 
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Revolution dramatically changed both judicial procedures and codes, not to 
mention the public perception and expectations of the legal system, the new 
system maintained a certain continuity with its predecessor.  In country that was 
eighty five percent peasant spread over eleven time zones with poor 
infrastructure and an insulated civil society, customary law naturally preceded 
the law codes promulgated by Moscow.  Thus the history of Soviet law was indeed 
in many ways Marxist, or primitively communistic if you will, before 1917 vis-à-
vis peasant customary law.  The concept of krugovaia poruka, or collective 
responsibility, developed out of the shared responsibility that defined the peasant 
relationship to villagers, the village, and the greater Russian state. As noted above 
peasant communes, dating back to medieval Russia, were collectively responsible 
for financial and labor obligations to the state or landowner. This often required 
peasants to make up for others who defaulted on their own debts.33 Since 
Emancipation and the Judicial Reform of 1864, volost courts determined the 
administration of criminal and civil issues for the peasantry. But legality for the 
peasantry was not merely a formal matter.  Frequently, the peasantry resorted to 
extra legal means, such as Arson, to adjudicate matters.34 While still a ‘primitive’ 
legal consciousness, the Bolsheviks perpetuated this mindset with the rise of the 
“people’s courts” and later with the “comrade’s courts”.  All of this, however, took 
place under the banner of an authoritarian state which was ultimately was the 
final arbiter of justice.  
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Justice as a tool, as state organ under the Party’s administrative control, 
remained intact until Khrushchev’s reform and in some ways continues today. 
The absence of a defined “social contract” --and its defining legal mindset-- in 
both Imperial and Soviet Russia allowed for very core of Russian legal 
consciousness to develop from the bottom up, not from top down.  However, 
Russian realities placed many matters of social order and behavior well beyond 
the control of the central authorities.  Thus through its communal roots, Russians 
relied on self-policing.  This phenomenon continued to define both Russian legal 
consciousness and collective identity all the way to the Khrushchev era. 
Ultimately Khrushchev’s reforms looked back to this crucial, and uniquely 
Russian, development.  The heavy emphasis on social activation and 
participation in the justice system and the new reliance on rehabilitation were 
clearly rooted in this.  In one sense, this paper hopes to shed light on the extent to 
which Khrushchev’s reforms overcame (or attempted to overcome) the systematic 
administrative impediments to ‘Justice’ in the USSR by reverting to more organic 
and historically relevant forms of legality.    
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Chapter Two 
 
Stalin’s Legal Paradox 
 
“The trusting Russian people were beginning to understand that it could be 
dangerous to trust too much.” 
 -Y. Yevtushenko 
 
Above all else, Stalin’s legal legacy --inherited from USSR Prosecutor 
General Andrei Vyshinsky-- necessitated Khrushchev’s legal reforms of the late 
fifties.  Stalinism, as the essence of Stalin’s ruling style, almost exclusively 
conjures the idea of a state run under a brutal, centralized, omnipotent, extra-
legal police organization.  For many ‘liberal Russians’ and Western historians, the 
“Great Terror” of 1936-1939 stands as the hallmark of Stalin’s rule.  Yet, with the 
collapse of the USSR and the opening of previously sealed archives, historians 
have increasingly deconstructed Stalin’s legend.   
Remarkably, new archival materials suggest that many officials within the 
Soviet state administration were concerned with notions of legality and the 
legitimacy of their actions.  This interpretation undermines the convenient 
“totalitarian” school of thought that constitutes the foundation of most 
interpretations of Khrushchev’s reforms and thus reopens the primary questions 
surrounding Khrushchev’s reforms. What was the role of law under Stalin?  What 
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were the existing structures and institutions of Soviet law that facilitated the 
terror and needed reforming? What necessitated Khrushchev’s reform of that 
role, since existing Soviet law previously seemed to have been an effect means of 
governance for the Party, which had substantial public support? This chapter 
argues that a reinterpretation of Soviet legality is necessary to the account for the 
numerous instances of public disagreement over the course of the purges and 
evidence which suggests that legality became both a rejuvenated means of party 
control over the populace --as opposed to sheer force-- and a codified, open 
response to public and elite fears of continued mass repression.  
 Before tackling the nature of Stalin’s justice system, it is necessary to 
elucidate the Soviet legal system’s organs and functions.  A number of various 
state administrations constituted the Soviet judicial system under Stalin: the 
Ministry of Justice, the Procuracy, the USSR Supreme Court, and in certain cases 
special extra-judicial conferences of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that were, 
however, subject to judicial review.  These organs were organized at both the 
national and all-union level, and guided by both the Fundamental Principles of 
USSR (e.g. All Union Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law etc) and the more 
specific Republic level fundamentals (e.g. RSFSR Fundamental Principles of 
Criminal Law etc.). The Union republics were allowed to tailor various aspects of 
criminal, civil, labor etc. laws to their region’s specific needs. (For example, 
misappropriation of water supplies could be a criminal offense in the arid Kazak 
SSR but not in water rich Ukraine SSR.)  The Soviet court system was organized 
in a vertical hierarchy of courts, culminating in the Republic Supreme Court and 
finally the USSR Supreme Court (All Union Supreme Court).  The USSR Supreme 
29
Court in turn appointed the ‘Procurator of the USSR’, who served as both the 
states main prosecutor and the overseer of all legal matters in Soviet 
administrations. The Procurator General later served as head of the Ministry of 
Justice (also known as People’s Commissariat of Justice). 
Unique to Russian law, the Procuracy proves to be the most difficult organ 
for Western scholars to understand. Peter the Great established the Procuracy in 
1711 as a supervisory organ: the ‘eye of the Czar’ to watch over the administration 
in the czar’s absence.  Its role varied in responsibilities and importance 
throughout the Imperial era until abolished by the Decree on Courts No 1 
November 24, 1917.35 At Lenin’s request, the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR 
reestablished the Procuracy in 1922.  Its reconstituted functions declared the 
Procuracy to be “independent of local authority and to supervise the legality of all 
acts by the government, enterprises, and citizens though its powers of protest, 
proposal and prosecution.”36 In 1933, the Procuracy was separated from the 
Supreme Court and lost its constitutional supervisory role but maintained a 
general supervisory role in the execution of legality. Then in 1936 with the 
creation of the People’s Commissariat for Justice, the Procuracy was drastically 
centralized. The Union Republic Commissariats were separated from the central 
All-Union Procuracy, but remained subordinate to the latter.    During the rest of 
Stalin’s rule, the Procuracy remained a bifurcated institution, as the USSR 
Procuracy and each constituent Republic’s Procuracy retained a vertical, 
independent personnel structure, but the Republic’s organs remained 
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subordinate (though not integrated) to the All Union ones.37 Given the economic, 
social, and political nature of Soviet State, the Procuracy played an enormous role 
in the adjudication of almost forms of legal action. Its functions under Stalin 
remained similar to those laid down in 1922. The Procuracy contained a number 
of  
“structured subdivisions, including the general supervision 
administration, the chief investigative administration, the 
personnel administration, the section for supervision over 
investigation in State security administration, the section for 
supervision of civil and criminal cases, a statistics section and 
others.”38 
Indeed, as we shall see later, the reconstituted role of Soviet legality in post Stalin 
years increased the Procuracy’s supervisory role.  
On the other hand, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible for the 
administrative trials of ‘socially dangerous’ elements, via its own special 
conferences.  Current research suggests the Ministry of Internal Affairs (a.k.a. 
Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MVD) had a far greater level of independence than 
previously considered. Their historical role was to ensure the political survival of 
the regime. The MVD used ‘Revolutionary tribunals’ to try cases against the so-
called ‘socially dangerous elements’. These tribunals were exempted from normal 
procedural regulations.  They could try cases with the defendant in absentia, and 
were given strict rules for mandatory minimum sentences.  The MVD adjudicated 
matters solely through administrative and extra legal means.   
 It was this particular organ that contributed to the perception of Stalin’s 
rule as one of institutional lawlessness, or more precisely, institutional 
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omnipotence. Paradoxically, however, the formation and maturity of the Soviet 
legal system made considerable progress under Stalin.   Stalin gradually replaced 
the institutionalized nihilism of the early Soviet legal system with a specific and 
increasingly sophisticated judicial administration based on written laws. This fact 
has proven difficult for many historians to subsume into the various 
interpretations of “Stalinism”. The most widely held interpretation, put forth by 
Peter Solomon Jr. and Robert Conquest, considers Soviet criminal legality merely 
a codification of Stalin’s personal power via the legal system.39 
Of course, the gap between Soviet statues and Soviet realities was often 
severe.  But throughout Stalin’s rule, the clashing ideologies of Procurator 
General Andre Vyshinsky and People’s Commissar of Justice Nikolai Krylenko 
embodied the ideological underpinning of the Soviet legal systems functioning. 
As Robert Thurston points out,  
“Krylenko favored a “radical, or nihilist, approach…” [this concept of] 
“Revolutionary legality” …entailed quick adjudication of all cases –
under laws that consciously reflected the regimes bias against the 
former propertied classed in favor of the former lower classes— and 
flexible norms that took into account the political nature of a charge… 
[Whereas] “between 1932 and 1936 Vyshinsky stood for the 
opposite on each of these points, instead advocating due process, 
careful judgments on the basis of evidence, a strong role for defense 
lawyers in all cases, firm legal codes that applied equally to the entire 
population, and a ‘strengthening’ of law.” 40 
They differed not only over the content of the law but also over the Judiciary’s 
administrative role, and throughout Stalin’s rule the development of Soviet 
legality shifted between these two extremes. In fact, these men openly clashed in 
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the early 30s, and their dispute paved the way for the reemergence of legal 
thinking in USSR.   
 In spite of Robert Conquest’s description of Vyshinsky as “a rat in human 
form”, the Procurator General demonstrated an unprecedented degree of 
autonomy in his legal thinking. Indeed, he openly defied the ‘Party line’ in the 
late twenties by decrying the legal nihilism of the early post-revolutionary period 
and supporting legal norms. In 1930, Vyshinsky wrote of the need for criminal 
law as a bulwark to protect the State.41 He stated this a full six years before the 
‘Party line’ shifted to meet his views.  His defiance suggests that his concern for 
legality was more than mere window dressing as his biographer Arkady Vaksburg 
suggests.42 Vyshinsky’s influence culminated in 1936 with the centralization of 
the Procuracy and later attempts to staff legal organs with qualified and well 
trained officials, accompanied by a fundamental attitudinal shift among high 
level officials towards law as a source of legitimacy.43 Vyshinsky’s report, “The 
Judicial System in the USSR,” which provided a legal-minded support for the 
Decree of August 7, 1932 presented the legal system as a means for defense of the 
“socialist property”. This was followed shortly by the Instruction of May 8, 1933, 
in which Stalin and Molotov called for the strict observance of law.  These, on the 
surface at least, might be brushed off as mere propaganda. However, Stalin 
criticized the over-zealous application of the August 7 Decree and demanded a 
curbing of arbitrary application.  This was no less than a paradigm shift for the 
central authorities. For better or worse, by insisting on uniform application and 
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interpretation, the central authorities altered the very perceptions of legality in 
the state.  Whereas before local officials could interpret clauses widely, so long as 
they felt it in keeping with “Revolutionary spirit”, they were now forced to work 
within a legal framework.  This is not to excuse the hideous nature of the central 
authorities plans, but merely to underscore the paradox of legal norms playing a 
role in Terror.  
The scholars of the “Totalitarian” school viewed these changes as both a 
cynical, empty promulgation and evidence of how Stalin crafted law for his own 
diabolical use.  However, new evidence suggests that the decree reflected more of 
a ‘crisis of authority’ across the USSR, and underscores the leadership’s 
recognition that carefully crafted law can more effectively govern a State than 
mere fiat. This is not to suggest that such policies were beacons of justice, but 
simply that the concern for legality in the 1930s was more pervasive than 
previously considered.   
 However, the merits of Vyshinsky’s argument alone may not have 
convinced Stalin.  Recent documents revealed that popular resistance occurred 
under Stalin on a far greater scale than previously known. One of the most 
notable examples of such resistance was the Pitelinskii Peasant Rebellion, in 
Riazan guberniia, less than 300 miles from Moscow. While a detailed account 
exceeds the scope of this study, it nevertheless is important to briefly outline the 
events that unfolded. By early 1930, the Communist Party’s collectivization was 
in full swing.  In the Moscow region, a notoriously “zealous” First Party Secretary, 
K. Ia. Bauman, led the Collectivization campaign.  In the Pitelinskii region, 
however, the collectivization brigade was particularly brutal, excessive, and 
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tactless. Their brutality and poor planning quickly created widespread opposition 
in the region. The rape of a peasant woman by a member of the collectivization 
brigade, on Jan 27 1930, set off a rebellion that raged for a number of days.  
Initially, the group of women leading the rebellion demanded that the leaders of 
the local soviet be put on trial within forty-eight hours, that new elections be 
scheduled to replace them, and that an investigation into the excesses of the 
collectivization campaign here be undertaken.  As historian Tracy McDonald 
points out, “The villagers themselves recognized the pivotal role of the sel’sovet in 
promoting and protecting their interests.”44 
However, it seems these actions suggest far more about the peasantry. 
First, the peasants demonstrated a sophisticated legal consciousness. They 
stressed not merely the importance of legality in settling disputes but demanded 
that the law, regardless of how it was codified, be applicable to the state, its 
representatives, and the people.  Unlike the earlier use of arson as a means to 
settle disputes, these peasants demanded justice, not retribution.  With respect to 
the formal aspects of justice, they insisted on trials and investigations that would 
have to be undertaken by existing legal institutions. Indeed, their demands 
suggest that the peasantry placed an unprecedented degree of importance and 
trust in the Soviet legal system.  
 The Pitelinskii Rebellion was not an uncommon occurrence during 
collectivization. Indeed, 1930 witnessed “13,754 mass uprisings, over a thousand 
44TracyMcDonald.“ APeasant’sRebellioninStalin’sRussia ”.in ContendingwithStalinism ,ed.Lynne
Viola.(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress:2002)p89McDonald’sessayisthesourcefortheall the
detailsofthePitelinskiirebellion.
35
assassinations of officials, and countless eruptions of protest or violence.”45 These 
events place Stalin’s “Dizzy with Success” of March 1930 and the later Party shift 
toward Vyshinsky’s legal thinking (discussed above) in greater perspective.  
Strong-arm tactics and legal nihilism ceased to be effective means of compulsion.  
Given peasant collective legal consciousness -- and its inherently egalitarian 
nature -- the rule of law proved far more effective.  However, the remarkable level 
of unrest suggests something further about the nature of the subsequent terror 
1936-39. These events certainly exacerbated Stalin’s and the higher party leaders’ 
paranoia and suspicion, and demonstrated their tenuous hold on power.  Indeed, 
rebellions among the peasantry and workers, the groups the party claimed to 
represent, severely threatened the Party’s creditability. The hysteria of the Terror 
makes far more sense in this context and sheds light on the both the Party 
leaders’, NKVD members’, local officials’ and population’s willingness to believe 
in validity of mass arrests and subsequent punishments. 
 Again, these lines of reasoning should not be confused as any sort of 
justification or excuse for atrocities committed in the Soviet Union. Indeed, 
Vyshinsky himself bears some of the blame for these injustices.  While his affinity 
to legal norms was clear, Vyshinsky’s public role as the vicious prosecutor in the 
infamous Show Trials and the perception of him as one of Stalin’s ‘henchman’ 
cannot be ignored. Two legal precedents, which Vyshinsky supported, laid the 
legal framework for the Terror: guilt by analogy and theory of evidence.  First, 
Vyshinsky’s Theory of Judicial Evidence in Soviet Law suggested that confession 
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provided enough evidence for conviction.  This soon became the foundation for 
the wave of trials based on nothing more than forced confessions. Secondly, the 
analogy clause, a hallmark of the 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code, allowed 
prosecutors to try and convict a person under laws, which, while not violated, 
‘resembled’ other articles of codified law:  
Art. 16. If a socially dangerous act has not been expressly dealt with 
in this code, the basis and limits of liability in respect thereof shall be 
determined in conformity with those articles of the Code that deal 
with the crimes more closely associated with it. 
 
This article and the infamous Article 58 gave Soviet authorities remarkably 
expansive powers of policing, trying and convicting persons of ‘counter 
revolutionary, terrorist’ actions.  However, an important distinction must be 
made between the excesses of the OGPU and the role of the Soviet judiciary in the 
Purges of 1936-1939.   
Shortly before his death, Andrei Vyshinsky once again took the center 
stage of the legal community at a speech to the Learned Council of the Law 
Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences Feb 5, 1953.  After musing on the 
nature of world capitalism, Vyshinsky’s speech turned to a diatribe against the 
then current theoretical conception of state and law in the USSR. His primary 
target was A.I. Denisov’s legal textbook Fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist Theory 
of State and Law.46 Vyshinsky attacked Denisov’s presumption that the state and 
law can be separated; that is, Vyshinsky refused to separate the ruling “class’’  -- 
the proletariat -- from the law as a sum of the class’ will. This Marxist conception 
of law was the underpinning for the current legal codes and procedures. Thus 
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debating this point was tantamount to debating the very concept of law and 
legality itself.  This in itself marked a dramatic break with the Stalin’s legal 
thinking.  
 Ultimately, the legacy of the Stalin period provided the foundation for 
examining Khrushchev’s legal reform.  The nature of Stalinism now seems more  
a reaction to events, albeit out of control, than previously considered.  In the 
perverted ways necessitated by the nature of an authoritarian system, the Party 
could only respond to the populace’s spontaneous violent collective resistance. 
Under Stalin, this led to paranoia and suspicion.  It found expression in the 
varying administrative and regulatory powers afforded the Ministry of Justice 
and the Procuracy. This cannot simply be reduced, as many have, to the 
precedence of law reflecting the regime’s confidence in its own power.  That is, 
the stronger the role of law, the more confidence the regime had in its own 
dominance. On the contrary, Stalin fell back on legality when popular uprisings 
threatened the regime’s viability and creditability. At the same time, however, the 
populace demonstrated a clear legal consciousness. And of course, sophisticated 
legal institutions existed, and a legal class fully developed.  All that was needed 
was a bridge between the popular conceptions of justice and the justice 
administered by the state.  This, while perhaps the most difficult to quantify or 
accurately assess on a wide scale, highlights very core of the problem of legality 
and Communist authority.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Khrushchev’s Dilemma: A Society In Crisis;   
‘Socialist Legality’ Redefined From Above  
 
“Unfortunately Justice is like a train that’s nearly always late” 
-Y. Yevtushenko 
 
The Soviet state faced a number of daunting problems by 1953.  Although 
many scholars consider Khrushchev’s ascension to power and subsequent 
reforms as an elastic response to Stalin’s excesses and a natural, controlled 
release of social pressures, recent archival materials present the reality of a state 
in crisis.  First, Stalin’s death was the harbinger of a serious Soviet identity crisis.  
Forty years of propaganda aimed at fostering a uniquely “Soviet man” (that is, a 
Soviet socialist mindset and worldview) made remarkable gains.47 The combined 
effects of Stalin’s rapid albeit brutal industrialization and the USSR’s victory over 
the Germans in the Great Patriotic War (i.e. Second World War) created a 
heightened sense of nationalism and if nothing else an acceptance of Communist 
Party rule. The Soviet Union went from a defeated, devastated, backwards nation 
in 1917 to great world power. Such a rapid change tore at the very fabric of Soviet 
society.  Rapid urbanization combined with the war’s devastation led to 
significant problems in adequately supplying food (and other items) to the cities, 
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creating the foundations for urban volatility.48 Likewise, contrary to propaganda 
claims, universal employment in the USSR was complete myth.49 Combined with 
the imminent release of prisoners from the increasingly unmanageable gulags 
and camps, these factors presented the party with the prospect of the creation of 
an entire class of marginalized peoples.  At the same time, however, by bringing 
to light many of the atrocities committed in Stalin’s name, the revelations of 
Khrushchev’s 1956 Secret Speech to the Communist Party’s Twentieth Party 
Congress threatened to undermine Party credibility in certain sectors of the 
population.  Of course, even if the Party could not reasonably maintain the gulag 
system, it could have maintained its hallmark arbitrary justice.  The state still 
required a means of coercion for those still not enamored with the Party’s 
promises of a better life in the future.  Thus the situation in immediate post Stalin 
USSR was fluid; the leadership needed to find a way to lead a Soviet state without 
Stalin at the highest and lowest levels of power.    
This chapter argues that the various social and political factors exerting 
pressure on society and therefore the Party necessitated broad and fundamental 
changes in both Soviet criminal and civil codes and procedures.  Party, 
Khrushchev’s legal reform provided a means to restore pride in socialism by 
seeking to bridge the gap between the masses and elites. At the same time, it is 
necessary to point out that the Party and state retained the right to use arbitrary 
force when directly threatened.  Pragmatically speaking, however, the “state” as a 
theoretical notion always retains this right. In so far as the USSR was concerned 
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extreme measures were reserved for a small category of political issues more 
clearly defined than earlier. This chapter focuses on both the debate that 
occurred between 1953 and 1958 over the nature of legal reform in the USSR and 
the context in which that debate took place, i.e. Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization 
program. As a form of ‘negotiation,’ the period before the re-codification provides 
insights into the characteristics of the legal reform and evolving nature of the 
Party’s rule.  
 
* * *
Even Khrushchev, who eventually denounced Stalin vehemently at the 20th 
Party Congress, openly and “sincerely” wept at Stalin’s death.50 But as he wept, 
Khrushchev also feared for the future.  For if Stalin did indeed command the 
respect and admiration of his countrymen, then the atrocities committed in his 
name could serve not only to undermine Stalin’s reputation, but the very system 
and Party that he forged.  As the journalist Giuseppe Boffa who lived in Moscow 
at the time of Stalin’s death puts it, “With the name Stalin were associated 
successes, struggles, sacrifices, victories, enthusiasms – in a word socialism, both 
as an ideal and a reality.”51 Thus the new “collective” leadership that existed in 
the years after Stalin’s death -- and basically represented the Party as a whole --
was uniquely threatened.   An old peasant saying summed up the populations 
perception of central authority:  “if only father Czar knew…. The population had a 
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penchant for exculpating national leaders while criticizing local officials and the 
system.    
This contradiction formed the core of the authority and identity crisis at 
the time of Stalin’s death.  In his Precocious Autobiography, the poet Yevgeny 
Yevtushenko presents a horrific but revealing account of Stalin’s funeral, which 
highlights these particular problems:  
“…tens of thousands of people jammed against one another [in 
Trubnaya Square] in a white cloud…at that moment I felt I was 
treading on something soft.  It was a human body. I picked my 
feet up under me and was carried along by the crowd. For a long 
time I was afraid to put my feet down again.  I was saved by my 
height.  Short people were smothered alive, falling and 
perishing.”52 
The authorities, whether through ignorance or ineptitude, could not manage the 
crowds of people hoping to catch a passing glimpse of Stalin’s body.  The 
emotions of the time were palpable on the streets: a mixture of grief, disbelief, 
fear and insecurity. Shortly after Stalin’s death, the new collective leadership 
debunked the ‘Doctor’s Plot’ -- a fabricated conspiracy in which Kremlin doctors 
were accused of poisoning Stalin.  This act would be a harbinger of revelations to 
come.   
As Khrushchev’s memoirs points out, aside from the power struggle at the 
top of the Party, the impending release of hundreds of thousands of prisoners in 
the gulags became the first major concern for the men who inherited the reins of 
the Party.  Khrushchev noted that not long after Stalin’s funeral Interior Minister 
of Internal Security and head of NKVD, Beria, presented the following proposal,  
52
YevgenyYevtushenko. APrecociousAutobiography .(NewYork:E.P.Duton&CoInc.1963)84 -85.
42
“Since many prison and exile terms are coming to an end and all 
these former convicts and exiles will be returning to their homes, I 
propose that we pass a resolution not allowing any of them to 
return without special permission from the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. And I propose that we require them to live in regions 
dictated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.”53 
The effects of such a release of the victims of the Great Purges would be 
widespread.  First, the return of prisoners to their homes might result in 
widespread opposition to the Party.  Those sent to the gulags would not only 
invariably return home disillusioned, angered and, as accounts of gulag life like 
Ginzburg’s Journey into the Whirlwind suggest, trained survivors and criminals. 
Moreover, the Party faced a crisis of coming to terms with the premature deaths 
of hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens in 1936-1938, either in mass killings 
of the mass operations of 1937-1938, in the inhumane gulag conditions, or in 
penal detachments sent to the front World War II.54 The party leaders would 
have to explain to countless families why their loved ones would never return.  Of 
course, as Beria proposed, they could have tried to keep the hundreds of 
thousands of released purge victims in exile.  With a powerful state security 
apparatus, the Party leaders still retained the option of keeping the Pandora’s box 
of Stalin’s Terror tightly closed.  The central question then becomes: why did the 
party threaten its own legitimacy in the wake of Stalin’s death by releasing 
prisoners and denouncing Stalin’s crimes? 
Paradoxically, the Terror that racked the party in the late 1930s had not 
completely undermined public support for the regime.  Data for 1939, suggest 
53
Khrushchev,325.
54 EugeniaS.Ginzburg, JourneyI ntotheWhirlwind .(NewYork:HarcourtBrace&
Company,1967).
43
that the total prison population in the USSR amounted to only 2% of the 
population. Recently declassified documents published in Neizvestnyi Gulag
show that the gulag system in 1950 contained 2,550,275 inmates of which 
578,912 had been charged with counter-revolutionary crimes.55 These numbers, 
while remarkably high, suggest that the Terror was not as ubiquitous as 
previously considered, therefore raising the possibility, indeed likelihood, that 
the Stalin and the Party still enjoyed popular support.56 In fact, the 
unprecedented popular sadness displayed at Stalin’s funeral suggests his popular 
appeal. The new leadership was immediately burdened with the extent of the 
cover-up.  The gulag system, as we shall see, was slipping out of control.  The 
Party needed to find a way to redress the problems of overburdened gulags 
without undermining its own credibility with the population at large by revealing 
the full extent of the Terror.   
A number of prison riots and rebellions, from 1952 on, demonstrated to 
the Party leaders the extent to which the gulag system was becoming increasingly 
unviable as the loyal Communists and outright criminals arrested en masse in the 
1930s were being supplemented with Nazi wartime collaborators and anti-Soviet  
post-war insurgents and guerillas.  This development posed a genuine problem 
for the re-establishment of Soviet power in the vast areas occupied by the 
Germans, especially in the Western Ukraine and the Baltic states. As late as 1947, 
Leonid Brezhnev provincial party secretary (obkom secretary) of the Dnieper 
Province was frequently shot at when he ventured outside the provincial capital 
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to visit collective farms.    In October 1952 in Norlissk, six months before Stalin’s 
death, a group of convicts serving terms of 25 years rioted under the banner of a 
black flag  (symbolizing anarchy) and shouted counterrevolutionary slogans. This 
group, comprised mostly of Ukrainian nationals, sparked a widespread riot in the 
camp that had to be contained by the MVD (Ministry for Internal Affairs) and the 
MGB (Ministry of State Security).  Over 1,200 inmates participated in the riots.57 
Later, in May 1954 a month long riot took place in Kazakhstan in which anti-
Soviet partisans from the Baltics took control of a camp.  Demanding that 
Politburo members Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Khrushchev come and negotiate 
with them, the rebels were greeted instead by five tanks and the MVD.58 These 
riots were just two examples of the type of ferment that existed in the prison 
camps across the country. What’s interesting is that the riots often took place 
under the leadership of outright anti-Soviet elements in the camps.  Indeed, the 
riots took on a decidedly political flavor and suggested to the Party leaders that 
the gulag population were politically suspect.  Ironically, those who entered the 
gulags in the 1930s as innocents or as common criminals were now truly 
suspected of harboring socially dangerous ideologies.  Most disturbingly for the 
party, however, was the fact that, like the authorities in Moscow during Stalin’s 
funeral, local authorities in the gulag had simply lost control.   
Thus, the problem of dealing with the unruly penal system underscored 
the problems of the criminal justice systems as a whole.  Under Stalin, all forms 
of crime, from petty theft to criminal negligence, could be under certain 
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circumstances interpreted as ‘counter revolutionary’, or anti Soviet.  Violators 
faced draconian mandatory punishments and eventual outright marginalization. 
Such practices and the accompanying legal mindset led to a ‘politicization’ of all 
forms of crimes and misdemeanors.  After Stalin’s death, this form of deterrence 
had ceased to be an effective means of control. With the gulags full of otherwise 
innocent people, and increasingly slipping out of control, the Party realized it 
must replace the Stalinist criminal justice system with more positive means of 
control. These problems did not simply spring themselves upon the Party 
suddenly.  Anticipating the problems that arising from the release of prisoners, 
the Party ordered the “exiling to remote areas of the USSR especially dangerous 
state criminals upon the completion of their sentences” in a 1948 decree of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.59 For three years before the 20th Party 
Congress(1953-1956), the Party struggled to alter the Party line on legality 
without undermining its own authority or creating too many legal obstacles to 
Party control.  
The Party’s response to the unrest in the gulag after Stalin’s death marked 
the beginning of a halting movement towards more clearly defined criminal 
legality.  In June 1953, the Party expelled and arrested Lavarenti Beria, the head 
of State security apparatus (NKVD), which controlled state security police, 
regular police and the penal institutions.  Khrushchev later viciously attacked 
Beria in his speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956.  Khrushchev’s criticisms 
were in many ways justified.  Beria ruled over the massive state terror apparatus 
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that outlived its usefulness.  Various social problems like juvenile delinquency, 
hooliganism, and rampant alcoholism indicated a society exerting its disapproval, 
not merely through these anti social elements but through pro-establishment 
calls for greater law and order.  The irony of the Terror was the seeming anarchy 
that prevailed just beneath the surface of Soviet society.  As Party leaders 
recognized their precarious situation, the Politburo ordered the Head of the First 
Special Department of the MVD Colonel Pavlov to investigate and report on the 
number of people repressed under Stalin and the current number of convicts 
serving time in the gulags.  After Beria’s arrest, Khrushchev ordered Procurator 
General, I. Rudenko to investigate the legality of the criminal proceedings that 
had taken place during the terror. This report started the procession of 
rehabilitation of Stalin’s innocent victims, via a laborious judicial review of their 
cases and a mass repudiation of the verdicts of the 1930s.  This process was not 
completed until Gorbachev’s administration (1986-1988). Upon receiving Pavlov 
and Rudenko’s reports Party leaders understood the magnitude of the Terror and 
sought creative and constructive way to redress it and re-integrate its victims into 
Soviet society to reduce the size of the gulag and make them more manageable.   
The Party first sought to do this by a sweeping amnesty on March 27th 
1953 for criminals serving shorter sentences.  The amnesty ordered: 1) immediate 
release of women with children of up to ten years of age, pregnant women, 
juvenile delinquents up to age 18, men over 55, women over 50; 2) the reduction 
of all sentences of over five years by half; 3) citizens who had served their time 
and been released were to have their criminal records expunged and voting rights 
restored; 4) finally, and most importantly, the Politburo called for a through 
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reevaluation of the USSR and Union Republic’s criminal statues.60 This re-
evaluation found it was 
“necessary to substitute administrative and disciplinary measures 
for criminal responsibility in cases committed in an official 
capacity, and in cases of economic, social and other less dangerous 
crimes to also reduce criminal responsibility.”61 
The Party’s slow but deliberate  “rehabilitation” of many of the gulag prisoners 
convicted of counter revolutionary crimes in the 1930s allowed for the judicial 
review on a case by case basis of the judicial charges and verdicts meted out to 
the victims of the Great Purges.  All cases were subject to review, including the 
cases of victims executed, prisoners who died in the gulags, and those who 
survived the camps.  As the movement toward legality gained momentum, the 
Party in 1953 finally overturned its 1948 decree on exile, claiming that the 
continued exile of more than 54,000 prisoners was based on MVD orders instead 
of court sentences.62 This Party decree underscores a number of new 
development in Party leadership’s legal thinking.  First, it tacitly recognized the 
illegality of its previous decree as a form of “double jeopardy”.  However, this 
same decree upheld maintaining exile for persons of “spies, saboteurs and other 
especially dangerous criminals” who were exiled as directed by the MGB 
(Ministry for State Security).  As the evidence from among gulag points out, there 
were in fact groups of radical anti-Soviet agitators in the gulag population.   In 
that light the seeming contradiction of the decree makes more sense.  The Party 
was reluctant to do anything that would directly threaten its power.  
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This notion of ‘exemption’, prevalent in Soviet legality in matters of state 
security, has been difficult for many scholars to deal with.  However, this author 
takes the stance that state security is the paramount concern of all states, and 
legal precedents often take backseat to pragmatism whenever the state feels 
threatened. For the rest of society, matters of state security were a passing 
thought, and evidence from the Purges suggests the populace was willing to 
overlook procedural violations when these were deemed necessary.  Indeed, the 
bulk of legal reforms that took place under Khrushchev reformed the far more 
mundane but relevant aspects of common criminal law that affected ordinary 
people and their relationship with the Soviet state. 
Concern for legality was not confined to the Politburo but manifested itself 
in Soviet literature and the press shortly after Stalin’s death.   It first found its 
way into public debate in 1953 in a series of articles criticizing local abuse of 
power. After Stalin, the Soviet Communist Party recognized the problem of over 
centralization.  Under Stalin, local, regional and Republic Party plenums took 
place infrequently and inconsistently, in violation of Party statutes mandating 
them.  Prompted by the desire to normalize government functions via legal 
norms and to delegate more authority to the localities, the Party increasingly 
demanded greater adherence to Party statutes with respect to the holding of 
plenary meetings of provincial and county party organs and congresses.  The 
Party began to focus on local issues as it shed itself of the conspiracy theory 
paranoia that defined the Stalin era.  
In this context, the Party presented violations of legality as isolated 
incidents that occurred at the lowest levels of power: a remarkable about-face for 
49
a Party that earlier routinely attributed every incident, mishap and inefficiency to 
“wreckers” and “counter-revolutionaries.” As early as 1953, calls went out for the 
strict observance of law and a greater level of responsiveness to the public by 
local authorities.  For example, Izvestiya derided the Tashkent procurators office 
for an unusually high rate of revoked sentences, over 40%, and a failure to 
respond to public outcries for public order.63 The high rate of revoked sentences 
suggested that the Prosecutor conducted sloppy and haphazard investigations 
and prosecutions. Izvestiya called for greater care on the part of the prosecutor 
and to increase the professionalism of the office.  
In another instance, Komsomolskaya Pravda disparaged the entire 
membership of the Mtsensk Youth Communist League  (Y.C.L or Komsomol) for 
failing to defend an innocent member falsely charged with beating her children.  
The reasons for the woman’s indictment are unclear, but press accounts suggest 
that this was the personal work of the local prosecutor.  The victim’s husband was 
a local official, and the charges against his wife may have been a case of 
blackmail.  But, the importance of this incident was rooted in the conclusions 
draw by the paper’s editors: that the local YCL members violated an “unwritten 
Soviet law – if you believe in a person, don’t let them be wronged.”64 The 
implications are numerous.  First, the editors urged the public to take a more 
active role in legal proceedings, which was a dramatic shift from the former ‘show 
trial’ justice of Stalin period, in which the public’s role was reduced to merely a 
chorus of support for the State’s accusations.  Secondly, the editors recognized 
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that Soviet justice failed to be correct on all accounts.  Thus, the editors implicitly 
called into question the power of the prosecutor in criminal proceedings, an issue 
which would later be dealt with through a reorganization of Procuracy.  
Under the veil of powerful language, the state-controlled Soviet 
newspapers and academic journals began to renegotiate the concept of Soviet 
legality.  “Strengthening socialist legality” soon became the stock phrase. While 
this statement presented the issue as a projection of state power and strength, the 
movement towards a greater respect for and adherence to the law was, if nothing 
else, a retreat from the ‘legal nihilism’ and abuses of Stalin’s time.  The rumblings 
of a legal revolution manifested itself first in the talk of “safeguarding the rights 
of Soviet citizens as embodied in the USSR Constitution.”65 Amid the party jargon 
in this particular article was a striking phrase: “A citizen of the Soviet state may 
work calmly and confidently, knowing that his rights are fully protected by 
socialist legality.”66 This phrase underscored the new movement. Legality 
became a means of protection not only for the state, but also for the populace.  
The Party’s explicit aim was to placate the public, so in that sense the new 
emphasis on legality was a concession.  But, initially this first volley for the new 
Soviet legalism, lasting two full years, initially only altered the Party line towards 
legality, while the letter of the law remained unchanged. Public discussion on 
altering the law did not emerge until 1955, but the period 1953-1958 presented 
various instructive stories in the major newspapers that defined and promulgated 
the Party’s new legal expectations. 
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However, one must keep in mind that the gradual movement towards 
legality was not a monolithic one; it was not carefully scripted or directed.  
Rather, in the periods leading up to re-codification of Soviet criminal law, lively 
debate took place in the public forum.  By 1955, the discussion revolved around 
the impending Khrushchev-initiated re-codification of the Fundamental 
Principles of Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes and Civil and Civil 
Procedure Codes.  The newspapers were full of demands for greater “enforcement 
and observance of law,”67 descriptions of “failures and misdeeds of prosecutors,” 
and demands for updated laws.68 Nikita Khrushchev’s closing speech at the 1956 
20th Party Congress on the crime’s of the Stalin era crystallized and publicized 
unequivocally the ‘de-Stalinization’ movement and its subsequent legal reforms.  
The drive for reform that began with Stalin’s demise went into high gear after the 
congress, as Khrushchev solidified his position as the head of the USSR and as 
the harbingering of dramatic change.  In his speech Khrushchev derided the “cult 
of the personality” surrounding Stalin, “which became at a certain specific stage 
the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party 
principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality.”69 The inclusion of  
violations of legality in the list of Stalin’s crimes was remarkable admission.  
While Khrushchev placed the blame for the purges squarely and solely on Stalin’s 
shoulders, he tacitly suggested that the problem was to some degree systemic.  
The elasticity of “revolutionary legality” of earlier times clearly failed the Party 
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and state by simply feeding the Terror.  As Khrushchev pointed out later in his 
speech:  
“After the criminal murder of Sergey M. Kirov, mass 
repressions and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality began. 
On the evening of December 1, 1934 on Stalin's initiative (without 
the approval of the Politburo --which was given two days later, 
casually), the Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive 
Committee, [Abel] Yenukidze, signed the following directive:  
"1. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of 
those accused of the preparation or execution of acts of terror.  
2. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of 
death sentences pertaining to crimes of this category in order to 
consider the possibility of pardon, because the Presidium of the 
Central Executive Committee of the USSR does not consider as 
possible the receiving of petitions of this sort.  
3. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs [NKVD] are 
directed to execute the death sentences against criminals of the 
above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of 
sentences."  
This directive became the basis for mass acts of abuse against 
socialist legality. During many of the fabricated court cases, the 
accused were charged with "the preparation" of terrorist acts; this 
deprived them of any possibility that their cases might be re-
examined, even when they stated before the court that their 
"confessions" were secured by force, and when, in a convincing 
manner, they disproved the accusations against them.”70 
Khrushchev implied that legal norms were necessary to regulate Party activity as 
well as criminal procedure.   
In 1957, this implication would save Khrushchev’s political position as 
First Secretary of the CPSU when the so-called “anti-Party group” attempted to 
overthrow him.  In a vote of the Party Presidium (later known as the Politburo), a 
majority of Khrushchev’s fellow members decided to unseat him as First 
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Secretary for various failings of his radical new program.  However, Khrushchev 
demanded strict adherence to Party by-laws, which stated that the First Secretary 
could only be unseated by a vote of the whole Central Committee. In a furious few 
days of political dealing, Khrushchev managed to gain the support of many 
Central Committee members, including World War II commander Marshal 
Zhukov.  He convened a special session of the Central Committee, and won its full 
support.  The “Anti-Party Group” affair spelled the end of the political careers for 
many of Stalin’s former close associates and Politburo members including 
Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Subrov. But the affair also marked a 
paradigmatic shift for the regime.  The vanquished were not executed or sent to 
the gulags, they were expelled from the Party but retained minor positions in the 
Soviet government and lived out the rest of their natural lives.  Khrushchev’s 
actions were without a doubt politically adroit, but his insistence on maintaining 
legality within the Party (in the form of Party by-laws) and granting leniency to 
his defeated opponents had much wider implications, for unlike Stalin 
Khrushchev did not consider his opponents traitors to the USSR.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Demand for Order from Below 
“The people were thoughtful, tense. The tension was felt everywhere. It could 
not be relieved by the speeches of Malenkov …who promised them more food, 
more clothes.”  
 
Y. Yevtushenko, 1954 
 
With the Soviet legal profession firmly promoting the issue of 
“strengthening socialist legality” and the debate assuming a prominent role in the 
major media, legal reform took on a new dimension: public discussion.  For the 
first time since 1936, the public engaged in an open discussion of Soviet legal 
legislation.  The openness of the debate on legal reform suggested that the party 
wished to provoke public interest and awareness of the law on a large scale.  Not 
only would a nominal debate in the major papers keep the public’s interest in the 
law high, but the discussion also created an illusion of public participation. The 
debate did not merely revolve around theoretical conceptions of law. Rather a 
good deal of the debate focused on practical matters, especially concerning 
juvenile delinquency, hooliganism and alcoholism all of which were inextricably 
linked.  In reality, however, public ‘participation’ or public input took on the 
decidedly anti-social nature that the authoritarian system necessitated.  That is, 
population’s social resistance via poor work performance and out right 
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“hooliganism” forced the Party to renegotiate the nature of Socialist law.  While a 
thorough examination of the labor movement exceeds the scope of this paper, the 
methods of social resistance utilized by the work force provide insights into the 
nature of more general social opposition.  The Russian social historian Vladimir 
Kozlov, in his book on mass disorders in the former USSR, suggests that in order 
to fully understand the nature of the Soviet state, it is necessary to unravel the 
“oversimplified relationship between people and state in an authoritarian 
political system.”71 
In 1954, Georgian Deputy Minister of Justice M. Lomidze discussed in a 
prominent journal some of the problems facing Soviet legal institutions.  He 
declared that,  
“Hooliganism is contrary to socialist law and order and the rules of 
socialist community, therefore in our country hooliganism has 
always been and always will be considered one of the most socially 
harmful crimes.”72 
Hooliganism was a broadly and ambiguously defined and frequently used phrase 
that covered various sorts of anti-social rowdy behavior.  Mostly acts of 
hooliganism entailed offenses like fighting, unruly behavior, obscene language, 
absenteeism, etc.  “Hooliganism”, the word choice of the authorities, was in itself 
telling.   By attaching the suffix “ism” to the word, the authorities betrayed its 
widespread nature.  Indeed, by the mid-1950s hooliganism, mostly in the form of 
juvenile delinquency and alcoholism, was endemic in Soviet society.  
The roots of this hooliganism were varied.  Many of the more egregious 
cases of widespread hooliganism, which in some instances developed into full-
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scale civil disturbances and riots, took place in regions most affected by rapid 
modernization and migration, like the areas in the Virgin Lands  -- rural and 
uncultivated areas in Central Asia, which Khrushchev attempted to developed 
agriculturally.   
Between 1953-1956, the central authorities went about dismantling the 
Stalinist police state; they radically reduced, by up to two-thirds, the number of 
MVD agents in the country.73 At the same time, the number of “marginalized 
people” in the USSR skyrocketed during and after the Second World War.  The 
death of up to 30 million, predominately male, Soviet citizens during the war 
resulted in a massive population of orphaned youth, single mothers and 
dislocated people.  The late 50s marked the early teen years for many of these 
orphaned and dislocated youths.  The convergence of all these factors would have 
caused massive problems in most societies, but the USSR was particularly 
vulnerable.  Ideology and patriotism played a very important role in the creation 
and maintenance of Soviet social expectations. However, L.F. Ilyichev, head of 
Agitprop --the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department -- explained in 1959 
the problem as such:  
“Young people can scarcely imagine what our country was like in 
the past, what gigantic strides it has made during the years of 
Socialism. The heroic deeds of their fathers in the Great Patriotic 
War (World War Two) are becoming to many of them a vague 
childhood memory….”74 
Thus, the authorities in the USSR had to contend with not only an identity crisis 
in the population at large caused by Stalin’s death, but with a even greater 
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problem in creating and maintaining a sense of national pride and purpose 
among the Soviet  youth, who had witnessed few of Soviet glories and understood 
little of the tremendous achievements of their parents and grandparents.  As 
Vladimir Kozlov further points out, “In general a modern industrial society has 
an extremely limited choice of mechanisms for self regulation.” The options for 
the USSR were an often variable balance between ideological controls and 
repressive measures. 75 
The full extent of the hooligan problem in the USSR after Stalin was 
reflected in the skyrocketing number of criminal convictions for hooliganism 
between 1946 and 1956.  In 1946 only 70,000 people were convicted of 
hooliganism; in the subsequent years convictions rose steadily culminating in 
200,000 convictions in 1956.  However, these numbers reflected only 
hooliganism that required judicial action.  The number of convictions of 
hooliganism adjudicated by the “comrade’s courts”  -- a creation of the 
Khrushchev legal reforms which devolved jurisdiction over lesser violations to 
more informal courts of one’s peers created in workplaces, apartment buildings, 
neighborhoods etc.  -- approached 500,000.   
Hooliganism constituted more than 40% of all registered crimes in the 
USSR. Not surprisingly, another “1.4 million people were picked up on the streets 
for alcohol abuse.”76 Likewise, the number of habitual offenders increased 
dramatically:  in 1953 5% of hooligan convictions involved repeat offenders, in 
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1957 the percentage rose to almost 10%.77 The demographics of hooliganism 
indicated that 71.3 % of hooligans were workers, 16.8% peasant farmers, and 4.1% 
white-collar employees.78 These figures indicate that workers, the supposed pillar 
of Soviet political system, were more inclined to hooliganism than other social 
groups.  Most importantly hooligans were predominantly young. Young people 
comprised half of the people arrested for hooliganism in Russia in 1956, and even 
more in non-Russian areas like Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia and Belorussia.   
 Ironically, however, the hooligan explosion grew out of the blanket 
amnesty issued in 1953 after Stalin’s death.  The amnesty, discussed in the 
previous chapter, eventually released 1,195,248 people from the prisons and 
gulags.79 Accounts of life in the gulags suggests that survivors were 
predominantly hardened criminals.80 Due to the nature of the amnesty, many 
petty, professional criminals were released. Since ex-convicts were a 
marginalized social group, who found it difficult to find jobs, apartments and had 
little choice but to return to a life of crime, they therefore became a “constant 
source of constant problems for the preservation of law and order.”81 By 1955, 
Komsomolskaya Pravda lamented, “Why are the streets on which we live in such 
disrepute?”82 
Vladimir Kozlov underscores the complexity of the hooligan problem with 
the example of the city of Molotov (formerly Perm).  For various reasons, the 
upsurge in hooliganism acutely affected the city of Molotov.  The upper echelons 
77
Ibid,138.
78
Ibid,139.
79
Ibid,140.
80
SeeGinsberg,Eugenia. JourneyintotheWhirlwind .
81
Kozlov,140.
82 KomsomolskayaPravda ,1955inCDSPVol.VIINo.16,15
59
of the Party were fully aware of the epidemic, for in 1954 Procurator General 
Rudenko made a special report on the growth of crime in this city.  Rudenko 
outlined two major reasons for the upsurge in crime:  1) the resettlement here of 
amnestied criminals and 2) the inability of the understaffed police to deal with 
hooligan problems as they were forced to focus on more serious crimes.  The later 
point was of particular importance, since the local population simply stopped 
reporting hooligan activities to the local authorities as they regarded such actions 
futile.  The hooligans did not reflect nation-wide unrest or malaise.  On the 
contrary, the local population voiced its collective displeasure with the 
breakdown of public order, with a vehement letter to Soviet Premier “VM 
Molotov, in whose honor the city had been renamed.”  The letter highlighted the 
rampant problem of hooliganism since the March 1953 Decree on Amnesty.83 
But even more interestingly, the letter demonstrates the population’s widespread 
uncertainty and fear over the deteriorating conditions of public order and 
highlights the population’s desire for law and order.  
 The Party leadership was forced to find a way to deal with the increasing 
instances of public disorder.  In the spring of 1955, Khrushchev personally 
ordered the MVD to investigate the increase in hooliganism in Moscow Oblast, 
and in the summer of 1955, the Central Committee Letters Department submitted 
to the MVD complaints of hooliganism filed by citizens in Cherepovets, Engels, 
Baku, Voronezh, Noginsk, Rovenki, and the Piatogorsk State Grain Farm.84 
Across the country the authorities confronted a double problem:  1) the anti-
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social behavior of various hooligan and criminal elements, and 2) the demand of 
law abiding citizens to restore order.    
The extent of the hooligan problem was abundantly clear from the 
frequency with which this problem was reported in the press in the period 
leading up to the 1958 legal reforms.   As early as 1953, Soviet authorities 
launched a propaganda offensive against the youthful offenders.  Newspapers 
show the Party’s concern about the growing restlessness of the youth. A brief look 
at some of the headlines in the major papers reveals the extent and depth of the 
Party’s concern: “Youth and Problems of Behavior and Morality,”85 “Lack of 
Initiative and Discipline Among Youth Decried,”86 Juvenile Delinquency and ‘the 
Streets’: a Case History,”87 “Measures for Improving School Discipline,”88 and 
“Weakness in Character Training of Youth Assailed.”89 It seems as if the Party 
wanted to channel youthful energies into Party-related activities, like the 
Komsomol (Youth Communist League, YCL).  The Party constantly appealed to 
the leadership of the YCL.  At the same time, the Party spent a great deal of effort 
discussing child raising and questions of behavior and morality.   
 Between 1953 and 1958 the sheer volume of articles, essays, and reports on 
the various aspects of juvenile delinquency in the Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press highlights the extent of the hooligan problem.  Examining how the issue of 
hooliganism developed in the press, it seems that as de-Stalinization movement 
took hold, the issue of Soviet youth became a bifurcated problem for the 
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authorities.  On one hand, a segment of the younger generation resorted --as in 
most cultures-- to decidedly anti-social behavior, and on the other hand, a large 
contingency of youth espoused a liberalized reformed Communism.  The shesti-
desyatniki, or children of the sixties, embodied by future Communist Party First 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev were the direct outgrowth of the Khrushchev 
liberalized notions of communism.  While Gorbachev called himself a child of the 
20th Party Congress, the shesti-desyatniki were hardly young “party-line” 
Communists.90 Many, however, eagerly embarked on the campaign to develop 
agriculture in the “Virgin Lands” in Kazakhstan, and in the Altai, Omsk, and 
Novosibirsk Provinces in Russia.  The dichotomy between the hooligans and the 
population at large mirrored the one that divided the Soviet youth too. One 
striking example of this phenomenon was the creation of a Communist Youth 
League peoples’ militia in Michurinsk, shortly after the murder of a young man.   
Fifty-one YCL members formed a militia auxiliary brigade to help combat late 
night hooliganism.91 This effort predated the official rise of a people militia, a 
peoples auxiliary police staffed by civilians, which would gain popularity in the 
later 50s and early 60s in the wake of legal re-codification. 
 Attempts to deal with hooliganism went beyond mere morality tales and 
propaganda.  The period witnessed serious attempts at school reform, improved 
job training for youth, and the ‘Virgin Lands’ campaign to involve youthful 
enthusiasm in the cultivation of new land to raise Soviet harvests.  But to some 
extent these preventative measures needed to be supplemented with a 
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normalized and liberalized criminal codes and procedures.  The sheer scope of 
current problems exceeded the authorities’ ability to handle them, creating a 
“crisis of authority” across the country.  A number of mass uprisings across the 
USSR, which were reported at length to the Central Committee, demonstrated 
that serious reforms were necessary as law and order appeared impaired.  
 The first mass uprising occurred in late 1953 in the Latvian town of Ludz.  
Students from a technical school, most of who were orphaned, dislocated 
Belorussian youth, started a “hooligan war” with local police.  After a series of 
beatings and attacks on local police, a contingent of students “effectively occupied 
the city.”  They “patrolled the streets with sticks and stones until the early hours 
of the morning” until a special police force finally restored order.  The Latvian 
chief Procurator informed Procurator General Rudenko about these events 
shortly after they occurred.92 
Later in the spring of 1954, a group of Komosomol volunteers arrived in 
the Virgin Lands.  In their first day off from work, a fight broke out between the 
volunteers and local workers. A Komsomol member was stabbed to death.  The 
fatality was reported directly to the Central Committee.93 A similar incident took 
place in August of the same year.  A group of young men in Omsk fought with 
train conductors. When the police tried to break up the fight, they were 
confronted with resistance and forced to open fire.94 
In mid-1955, the Central Committee ordered the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to restore order at Piatigorskii State Farm, in Kazakhstan where 
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widespread hooliganism disrupted the work of the farm.  In 1956, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs reported to the Central Committee about skirmishes between 
local inhabitants and workers from other regions.95 
In July 1956, food shortages caused a riot among group of young 
Armenian workers heading to Kazakhstan to harvest grain in the Virgin Lands.  
When some of their compatriots were arrested, a large contingency of youth 
surrounded police headquarters and demanded their comrades’ release. The 
siege lasted sixteen hours.  Amazingly, the rioting youth had been accompanied 
on the train by a group of Armenian State and Party leaders!96 In December 1957, 
a group of students returning from harvesting cotton in Uzbekistan rioted at a 
remote train station.  The student looted food stalls, resisted arrest, and 
physically assaulted two police officers.97 These are just a few of the many 
examples of problems Soviet authorities faced:  unrest in the Virgin Lands, 
hooligan riots, and ethnic conflicts in both ethnically de-populated areas and 
resettled areas across the country.  
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of many of these uprisings was the 
underlying desire among participants for ‘social justice’.  With the exception of 
the genuine hooligans, whose opponents called for order and justice, many of the 
uprisings in the Virgin Lands and in the ethnic conflicts called for justice.  For 
example, many of the more violent uprisings in the Virgin Lands were responses 
to local authorities’ poor organization, poor working conditions, living 
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conditions, food supply etc.98 But ultimately, the extent of these problems, which 
scholars have only recently come to understand, sheds new light on the meaning 
of Khrushchev’s legal reforms then underway.  The Party badly needed to restore 
order.  Indeed, the Soviet population (and occasionally the hooligans 
themselves!) demanded it.  
However, as previous chapters have argued, the Party was unwilling and 
unable to return to Stalinism and secure order through Terror as it had 
attempted in the 1930s.  In January 1956, Politburo member K. Voroshilov spoke 
to the Central Committee at length about the problems of Soviet youth. He 
demanded that, “Communist and YCL members [could not] overlook the 
incorrect public behavior of certain young people in everyday life”.  He outlined 
the youth problem as a matter of improper upbringing and training.  But at the 
very opening of his speech, Voroshilov called for a speeding up of the drafts of the 
USSR Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Codes as necessary to ensure the 
protection of civil rights.  Likewise, he praised the new regulations governing the 
Procurators office as a necessary precondition to strengthening the rule of law in 
the USSR.  
Shortly thereafter the Party speeded up the efforts to normalize law and 
order. First, the USSR Supreme Court clarified the laws on self-defense. The 
court ruled that under Article 75 of the USSR Criminal Code, only persons who 
inflicted “severe and unnecessary injury on their attacker” could be held 
criminally liable.99 The impetus for this reform was clear.  The extent of 
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hooliganism had reached such levels that the public was liberated, if not tacitly 
encouraged, to take action. Next, a decree of the Presidium of the Russian 
Republic Supreme Soviet, published on Dec 20 1956, radically altered the 
prosecution of hooliganism: 
“The Presidium resolve[d] that: 
 
1. Petty hooliganism shall be punished by 
incarceration for a period of three to 15 days, if 
those acts are not subject to punishment under art 
74 of the Russian Republic Criminal Code. 
 
2. Materials concerning petty hooliganism are to be 
examined by a people’s judge within 24 hours after 
they are submitted to the court by militia agencies, 
and the sentence of the person who had committed 
the hooligan act is to be carried out immediately 
and is not subject to appeal.  
 
3. Persons convicted for petty hooliganism are to be 
held in preliminary detention cells or in prison and 
employed in physical work; during the period of 
incarceration they are not to be paid wages at the 
place of employment.”100 
Two interesting facts accompanied this decree, which was published in a Russian 
state newspaper, Sovetskaya Rossia. First the article suggested that Article 74 of 
the RSFSR Criminal Code, which stipulated that offenders were to be punished 
for hooliganism, was too exclusive in its definition of hooliganism and therefore 
was not applicable to many instances of public disorder. Secondly the paper 
points out that while earlier a person convicted of hooliganism under Article 74 
would retain that conviction in his/her criminal record for life, those prosecuted 
under the new law would not have such a conviction placed in their records.  So 
while the new decree seemed to project greater state powers of prosecution, it 
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also created a more flexible and considerate legal response to hooliganism.  This 
opening volley of Khrushchev’s legal reform made concessions to both the 
hooligans and the population at large.  It resisted the both the ‘politicization’ and 
‘criminalization’ of minor offenses, in order to avoid increasing the prison 
population and marginalized groups.  But, at the same time, it stiffened penalties 
for repeated offenses and opened social channels to pressure the youth into 
proper behavior.  
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Chapter Five 
 
The Reforms and the Consequences 
“But how do we remove Stalin from within Stalin’s heirs?” 
-Y. Yevtushenko 
 
“The Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all times and to everyone.” 
-F. Kafka  
 
In the wake of the 20th Party Congress, many demanded a radical 
liberalization of Soviet law.  Some called for the outright assumption of 
innocence, a guarantee that had never before figured into Russian or Soviet law. 
Many advocated an outright ban on any ‘unnecessary’ means of obtaining 
confessions -- i.e. torture -- and called for laws that restricted or eliminated self-
incrimination when determining guilt.  In the same vein, many called for greater 
protection of the accused, such as the right to counsel, ability to challenge 
evidence, and the right to have the last word in the trial etc.  And finally, scholars 
nearly unanimously called for the reinterpretation of complicity in criminal cases 
and the complete ban of guilt by analogy: an elastic clause that allowed a 
defendant to be convicted of a crime which he/she had not committed but which 
was ‘analogous’ to the defendants actions.  This clause and the extra-legal MVD 
‘Special Boards’ (internal MVD tribunals endowed with powers to adjudicate 
cases and dispense sentences outside the courts) were the most heinous 
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violations of legality under Stalin.  The criminal legal reforms proceeded over the 
course of two years.  First in December 1958, the Presidium of the Soviet Central 
Committee passed the “Fundamentals of USSR Criminal Code and Criminal 
Procedure” and in 1960 the RSFSR (and other Union Republics) enacted new 
Criminal Codes and Codes of Criminal Procedure.  The “Fundamentals” 
established an All-Union basis for the various reforms in the Republics. 
Ultimately, the reforms dealt with four major issues: 1) reforming and 
strengthening the role of the Procuracy 2) the establishment of normalized and 
strictly adhered to criminal law procedures 3) a reform of criminal law especially 
with respect to standards of guilt, validity of evidence, and striking a balance 
between administrative adjudication and criminal adjudication, and 4) various 
related reforms to involve the public in law enforcement and criminal 
adjudication, such as the establishment of “citizens’ militias” (or druzhinniki,
informal volunteer groups that policed local communities) and the comrades 
courts -- spontaneously created courts which held trials in work places, 
apartments and neighborhoods to redress minor violations. In each case, the 
Party’s reforms reflected not only a greater concern for legality, but also the 
population’s desire for greater order and a far less repressive police apparatus.    
 A precondition to reforming the Soviet Legal system was clarifying and 
strengthening of the role of the Procuracy and the Procurator General.  As 
discussed in chapter two, the role of the Procuracy in Soviet Law was nearly 
ubiquitous.  The Procuracy oversaw the both the legality and proper execution of 
all codes and decrees.  It was the state’s chief investigative body, and in the 
courtroom played the role of both the prosecutor and defense.  In June 1955, the 
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Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet confirmed new “Regulations on the Work 
of Supervision Performed by the Prosecutors Office in the USSR”.  These 
regulations, combined with the 1953 termination of MVD Special Boards, greatly 
enhanced the role of the Prosecutor in criminal procedure.  From a criminal law 
perspective, the Procurators office played its most important role in the pretrial 
investigation.  Like in other continental European judicial system, the pre-trial 
investigation played an enormous role in establishing the guilt or innocence of 
the accused. Since the investigator has the sole authority to bring the case to trial, 
it was rare that a prosecutor brought a tenuous case to trial.  Moreover, 
investigators with the prosecutor’s consent could decide not to prosecute and 
transfer the accused back to a less formal entity, like the comrades’ court for 
more informal justice, or commit him/her to medical care.101 The abnormally 
high rate of convictions in Soviet Union can be explained partially through this 
procedure.   
The Prosecutor was responsible for a lengthy investigation, as Procurators 
on all levels were obliged to (Article 23) “participate in criminal cases in court 
and submit their conclusions on questions arising in the course of the trial” and 
“lodge protests, in a manner prescribed by the laws, against illegal and ill-
founded judgments, decisions, findings and decrees, of judicial bodies.”102 Also, 
to gain public confidence and redress the institutional failings during the Terror, 
the decree required the Procurator’s office to ensure that “no one [was] arrested 
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except upon court orders or with the sanction of the prosecutor.”103 The same 
decree charged the Procurators office with ensuring the enforcement of the legal 
incarceration of any detainee and laws on the treatment of detainees.   The Party 
increased the Procurator’s role in the post-Stalin period and essentially turned 
the Procuracy into a bulwark against arbitrariness. Given the Procuracy’s unique 
role as the arbiter of justice in the USSR, the reform of the Procurator’s roles and 
responsibilities was critical to creating more normalized justice.  
 The following example underscores the Prosecutors new role: Upon the 
receiving a request for a warrant to arrest a 17 year old man in Lvov, the local 
prosecutor determined that the young mans actions, which not doubt could have 
been prosecuted under Article 74 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism), did not 
require full prosecution, so the Prosecutor decided to refer the case to non-
judicial action.  
 Procuracy reforms were the forerunner of more dramatic Criminal 
Procedure reforms. While the Procuracy as an institution assumed a more clearly 
defined role in criminal proceedings, legal reform also required more stringent 
guidelines guaranteeing the rights of the accused.  The blatant violations of the 
rights of the accused during the Great Terror (that came to light after 
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech) severely undermined the credibility of the Soviet 
law.  With the Procuracy now the sole agency that could prosecute cases, as the 
special boards were now banned, Soviet authorities turned to reforming the 
various procedural statutes that allowed for egregious violations. The procedural 
code reform can roughly be broken down into two categories:  1) reforms that 
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redressed the Terror and 2) reforms aimed at strengthening public (and possibly 
worldwide) confidence in Soviet criminal law. While these two goals frequently 
overlapped, the distinction remains relevant as the legal reforms were far more 
complex than merely ‘removing Stalin from Stalin’s heirs.’104 
The first and most fundamental revision in the 1958 Fundamental 
Principles (and in the 1960 RSFSR Procedural Codes) was the Article 7  (Article 
13 of the RSFSR Criminal Law Code), which stated, 
“Justice in criminal cases shall be administered only by courts. No 
one may be deemed guilty of committing a crime or subjected to 
criminal punishment except by the judgment of a court.”105 
This article’s importance should not be underestimated. This clause banned the 
use of all extra-legal means of prosecution, including, special water and railroad 
courts, summary proceedings in political cases, and secret police special boards, 
all of which had been used as the primary prosecution means for the Terror.106 
The new codes further stipulated that the Procuracy must oversee all preliminary 
investigations, including those of the police --both state security and regular 
police. The new Procedural codes further undermined the ability of  extra judicial 
organs to carry out punishments like exile, banishment, imprisonment in labor 
camps, or execution.107 
The next reform of the ‘de-Stalinist’ section set limits on the time that a 
defendant could be imprisoned during the preliminary investigation and the 
established defendant’s rights to defense counsel during these preliminary stages.  
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Under the previous law codes, not only could the accused be held in detention 
indefinitely while the investigation proceeded, but the accused was not 
guaranteed the right to counsel until he or she was indicted and the case was 
taken to trial.  With the strengthened role of the prosecutors, the more glaring 
violations of ‘justice’ were eliminated. 
 The Procedural reforms went beyond ‘de-Stalinization’ by incorporating 
vastly more liberal legal guarantees and rights.  First, the new Codes stipulated 
that courts of first instance must be presided over by a People’s Judge and two 
‘Lay Judges’.  The lay judges held quasi-judicial positions and participated with 
the People’s Judges in deciding the verdict and sentence of the accused.  The ‘Lay 
Judges’ vote in the courtroom held equal weight to the professional judge on the 
bench.  The ‘lay judges’ were elected from the local population, but were not 
professional jurists.  In a sense, they represented the ‘people’ in the courtroom, 
and if nothing else, the lay judges gave the perception of plurality and fairness.  
Also, the new codes clarified the ‘burden of proof’ and standards of guilt in 
Criminal cases. Harold Berman noted the most important of these:  
1) Art. 20, that the court, procurator, investigator, or person 
conducting an inquiry may not transfer the obligation of proof to 
the accused. 
2) Art. 46, that the accused has the right to present evidence, but that 
it is forbidden to extract statements from him by force, threat, or 
other illegal means, and no punishment is applicable to him for 
refusing to testify. 
3) Art. 301, that the judgment of the court shall be based only on 
evidence considered in the trial.  
4) Art. 309, that the accused shall be acquitted if his participation in 
the commission of the crime is not proven. 
5) Art. 309, that the conviction may not be based on assumptions, but 
shall be decreed only if the guilt of the accused is proved in the 
course of the trial. 
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6) Arts. 342, 344, that on appeal a conviction shall be vacated and the 
case terminated if the findings of the court are not confirmed by 
evidence considered in the judicial session.108 
While the new codes fell short of declaring that “the accused is innocent until 
proven guilty”, the new rights granted to the accused created a case of de facto 
innocence before proven guilty.  The articles Berman cites were found in both the 
All Union Fundamentals and the RSFSR Codes and presented the first real 
guarantees of rights for the accused under Soviet law.  First, Article 46 banned 
the use of torture, pressure and other threats to obtain information.  It also and 
recognized a suspect’s right to avoid self-incrimination and remain silent.  
 The final two major changes in the Procedural codes reflected the Party’s 
need to involve the public in the justice system in order to take pressure off the 
police and regular courts which were overburdened with “hooligan” cases 
involving public nuisances and misdemeanors.   The reforms stressed educational 
role of the courts and allowed a greater degree of popular participation in legal 
proceedings.  Article 41 of the Fundamentals empowered members of a person’s 
‘collective’ (farm, factory bureau etc.) to act as either  ‘social accusers’ or ‘social 
defenders’.  These posts were designed to represent the collective voice of the 
institution represented in the courtroom.  Article 3 of the Fundamental Principles 
(and Article 3 of the RSFSR Codes) required that, 
“by all its activity the court shall educate citizens in the spirit of 
loyalty to the Motherland and to the cause of communism, and in the 
spirit of exact and undeviating execution of Soviet laws….and the 
honor and dignity of citizens and for rules of socialist communal 
life.”109 
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This article allowed the People’s Courts in consultation with the Procurator to 
refer less serious cases to lower more informal courts, like the ‘comrade’s courts’ -
-a new judicial institution which involved the defendants’ co-workers and 
neighbors and played a more instructive role than more formal judicial means.   
 The third, and arguably most important part of the reforms took place in 
the Criminal Codes themselves.  The Criminal Codes, both the Fundamentals and 
the Union Codes, were divided into two ‘Parts’:  the General Part and the Special 
Part.  The Special Part dealt with crimes against the state. While drastically 
altering the Stalinist codes, especially the 1934 Amendments on cases involving 
terrorism, they ultimately differed in degree, not kind, and marked only a 
“selective disassociation” from legal the past.110 However, guilt by analogy was 
removed entirely.  This clause, part of Article 16 of the previous Criminal Code, 
was a particularly insidious statute and a hallmark of arbitrary justice whereby 
the accused could be convicted of a crime he or she had not committed but which 
was analogous to the offense perpetrated.  
 The ‘Special Part’ of the Fundamental and Union Criminal Codes 
eradicated many of the more appalling statutes and draconian penalties of 
Stalin’s criminal law.  The most obvious changes were nothing less than a 
paradigmatic shift in language. Throughout the reforms the terms “socially 
dangerous acts” and “acts of social defense” were completely abandoned (in favor 
of simply “crimes” and “punishments”) along the term “counterrevolutionary 
crimes”  (which was replaced with “especially dangerous crimes”), “restoration of 
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the bourgeois state” and “the workers-peasant state”.111 The codes also reduced 
maximum sentences for certain crimes.  “Wrecking”, an offense broadly 
interpreted to great detriment in the Purges, had been hitherto punishable by 
death. Now “wrecking” was to be punishable only by 8 to 15 year prison terms.  
The crime “sabotage,” which was defined as the conscious “non-performance of 
duties” with the aim of undermining state authority, was removed entirely from 
the code.112 The codes still placed a tremendous degree of power in the hands of 
Soviet authorities to deal with dissent, opposition, but laws most applicable to the 
majority of the population were dealt with in the General Part. 
 Like many of the procedural reforms, the code reforms of the General Part 
underscored both the level of liberalization evident in the post-Stalin USSR and 
the extent of the authority crisis of authority at this time. Given the extent of the 
much discussed hooligan problem and the inability of authorities to control the 
rebellious gulag.  Khrushchev’s legal reforms seem to constitute a legal response 
to these problems.  For example, the authorities attempted to deal with various 
aspects of the hooligan problem in the reforms.  The codes raised the age limit of 
criminal responsibility from 12 to 14 for serious crimes and from 12 to 16 for 
lesser crimes.  Likewise, the codes now stipulated that individuals under the age 
of 18 could not be banished or exiled from the USSR (Article 24) and if sentenced 
to “deprivation of freedom,” they must serve out their time in special labor 
colonies for juveniles (Article 23). The new codes broke down hooliganism into 
three categories: petty hooliganism, ordinary hooliganism, and malicious 
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hooliganism.  The new categories reflected a hierarchy of punishments, from 
administrative means to deprivation of freedom of up to five years.   The reforms 
answered society’s demands that the state deal more effectively with the problem 
while avoiding the type of strong armed tactics that had characterized earlier 
attempts to bring order to Soviet society under Stalin.     
 The new codes altered the degree of guilt for complicity in crimes from 
mere negligence to “intentional joint participation in the commission of the crime 
(Article 17).”113 The new statutes also lowered the maximum sentence for 
imprisonment from 25 to 15 years for adults and a maximum of 10 years for 
minors.  Also, the codes instituted more lenient rules that allowed of a person’s 
criminal record to be eliminated for good behavior in the case of persons 
sentenced to terms of greater than three years.  The procedures also facilitated 
parole of  the convicted for good behavior.114 Once again, Party officials seemed 
to have attempted to redress the authority crisis of the post Stalin period via more 
liberalized criminal norms.  The creation of an entire class of marginalized people 
who were quite literally forced to live a criminal life due to their past records had 
presented a great problem for Soviet authorities.  Attempting to ensure that such 
“criminalization” not occur once again, the authorities liberalized both the 
criminal codes and procedures.    
 The sheer number of crimes and offenses listed in the Fundamentals and 
Union codes makes an in-depth analysis of each section impossible in a study of 
this size.  The codes were divided into sections by categories of crime: against the 
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state, against the administrative system, against life, health and freedom of 
persons, property crimes, economic crimes, and military crimes. However, many 
of the changes concerned problems the Soviet authorities faced in regard to 
public order.   Overall, the reforms reduced sentences across the board. The 
maximum detention time was reduced.  This was especially true for minor 
offenses, many of which ceased to be criminal offenses and were now punishable 
by administrative means via a system of fines and reprimands. 115 Punishment 
for theft in particular was reduced dramatically, from a minimum of 7 years to 3 
months.  Likewise, the codes reestablished degrees of theft and drew distinctions 
between stealing, extortion, and improper appropriation. 116 
Apart from Khrushchev’s reform of the Procuracy, Criminal Codes, and 
Criminal Procedure Codes, a series of a related reforms attempted to engaged the 
public in the legal system and create more informal methods for dealing with 
minor crimes and public disorder.  These reforms underscored the authorities’ 
problems with maintaining order after Stalin.  The relative calm of the post-Stalin 
period ironically gave birth to the hooligan problem.  The release of social 
pressure undermined order that it maintained for years.   
 Engaging the public in law enforcement via the comrade courts, collective 
probation, people’s militia (druzhinniks), and anti-parasite regulations was not 
just a response to public’s demand for order.  Rather, such measures indicated 
that the authorities themselves could not continue to maintain a police state. 
With the Criminal Code’s new emphasis on non-criminal justice as means to 
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address and control anti-social behavior, the party rejuvenated an old Bolshevik 
institution: the comrades’ court. While not a court of first instance, the comrades’ 
courts were an alternative to criminal prosecution of minor offenses.  Under the 
new codes, a Prosecutor could refer minor offenses to the comrades’ courts.  The 
comrades’ courts were as close to a jury trial as the Soviet legal system ever came. 
Comrades’ courts were established at “factories, offices, collective farms, housing 
collectives, street communities and housing collectives where the collective 
membership exceeded 50 people.”117 Comrades’ courts heard cases involving the 
following: 
1) Infringements of labor discipline 
2) Drunkenness or disorderly behavior in public or work 
3) Unworthy conduct towards wife children or parents 
4) Disturbances in flats and hostels; quarrels among inmates 
5) Property suits up to 50 rubles 
6) Other anti social behavior not involving criminal liability and 
7) Minor offenses referred to them by the militias, prosecutor or 
court 
 
Indeed, the comrades’ courts dealt with the most common manifestations 
of deviant behavior.  The sessions of these judicial entities, like the Peoples 
courts, were presided over by three judges, and all proceedings were open to the 
public.  However, in the comrades’ courts not only did the collective have a voice 
through the people’s accuser and defender, but anyone present in the courtroom 
was allowed to speak up or ask questions. The burden of proof did not rest on the 
accused, but the standards of guilt were considerably lower than in the regular 
courts. Sentences were passed by a majority vote of the judges. In cases of 
117
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genuine repentance, a guilty verdict did not necessarily result in a penalty.  
Sentences were limited to the following: 1) public apology 2) “comradely caution” 
3) public condemnation 4) public reprimand with or without publication 5) 
reasonable fines 6) suggestions to managers to demote the offender to lower paid 
work 7) eviction from residence or discussion of such an action 8) damages in 
conjunction with any of the previous sanctions.118 The popularity of the courts 
was clear shortly after the reforms.  By 1965, over 220,000 comrade’s courts held 
sessions in the USSR, and by 1967 there were more than 153,000 sessions in the 
RSFSR alone.119 
For relatively minor offences convicted earlier in the formal Peoples’ 
Courts, an alternative means of punishment was created in the same vein of 
public participation that the comrades’ courts represented.  “Collective 
probation” allowed convicted offenders to be conditionally released into the 
custody of their work place for a so-called “communal re-education”.  A number 
of stipulations such were required for such probation, such as the level of 
criminal offense, genuine repentance, evidence that the offense was the offenders 
first, and intervention by the workplace on the offender’s behalf.  The prisoner’s 
probationary period ended one year after the conviction on the condition that the 
convicted person demonstrated their reform through ‘honest work’ and 
‘exemplary conduct.’120 
On March 2, 1959 a decree of the Communist Party Central Committee 
and USSR Council of Ministers, ‘On the Participation of the Working People in 
118
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the Maintenance of Public Order’, created ‘voluntary people’s detachments for 
safeguarding public order’.121 At the time the main police force in the country 
was the ‘people’s militia’ since the MVD only possessed small influence due to its 
shrinking ranks.  To supplement the militia, the voluntary detachments or 
‘druzhinniki’ were to patrol the streets as a preventative force.   The ‘druzhinniki’ 
had the right to order citizens to obey the law, request to see the identification of 
anyone violating public order, report such violations to the regular militia, arrest 
an offender for up to one hour (only in specific circumstances), and commandeer 
vehicles to transport injured or sick people to safety.  Each ‘druzhinnik’ member 
received training from the party, militia, the military, and the Procuracy.  While 
their powers fell far short of the militia’s, the druzhinniki played an important 
role in maintaining public order. Shortly after the introduction of the 
‘druzhinniki’, nearly 170,000 peoples’ detachments were created, with over seven 
million participants.122 
The final and most controversial of Khrushchev’s reforms was the 
adoption of  “parasite” exile laws that allowed for the exile of chronic “parasites” -
- or individuals who refused to work or habitually committed petty crimes.  The 
problem of the anti-parasite legislation in many ways crystallizes the problem 
that Soviet authorities and Soviet society faced in reforming Stalin era law.  Eight 
of the fifteen republics passed anti-parasite law between 1957-1959.  In general, 
anti-parasite laws allowed a local community to come together and threaten or 
ultimately exile individuals who perpetually avoided work and lived on unearned 
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income. Such individuals were sent to labor camps for two to five years.  
However, this legislation caused great problems for Soviet authorities, as 
evidenced in the large debate that took place in the major media. A great number 
of lower ranking party and government officials and factory workers supported 
the measures as means of ensuring greater public order and economic “fairness.” 
However, some Soviet legal scholars, like G. Anashikin, Vice-Chairman of the 
Russian Republic Supreme Court, railed against the vague language and 
seemingly expansive definitions of ‘parasitic lifestyle.’123 Considering the scope of 
the hooligan problem, not to mention the existence of unemployment in the 
USSR, many in the legal field feared that the parasite legislation would 
overburden the Procurators office and damage society’s social fabric.  Also, it 
seems fair to assume that they feared adding people to the deteriorating 
gulag/penal colony system, as the Procuracy under the 1955 reforms was now 
required to oversee the gulag system. Eventually both sides of the argument 
reached a compromise that limited the role of the public in initiating anti-
parasite prosecutions by ensuring that only a Prosecutor or the militia could do 
this. Likewise later amendments ensured the rights of the accused such as 
defense counsel and calling witnesses.124 
Clearly, the legal reform movement of this period went a long way to alter 
both the letter and spirit of Soviet law. However, some scholars argue that the 
USSR (and Russia) made many legal promises but honored very few of them. 
While there were exceptions, it seems the majority of cases honored the reforms, 
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and in doing so greatly heightened the status of the role of law in the USSR.  
Although by no means exhaustive, court cases in which the newly reformed 
criminal codes and criminal procedural codes were relevant will be examined 
below. 
 The Case of Grudian. Moscow City People’s Court convicted Grudian of 
theft of State property under Article 118 of the RSFSR Criminal code. He was 
sentenced to deprivation of freedom and the confiscation of his property.  
Grudian’s wife filed suit with the local prosecutor and militia to exclude from the 
list of Grudian’s possessions many household items that she had acquired before 
their marriage. The Moscow City Court upheld Mrs. Grudian’s suit in part, for 
many of the items she mentioned were excluded from the list and slated for 
appropriation by the state.  In its initial ruling, the Moscow Court failed to 
investigate the plaintiff’s claims of prior ownership and furthermore failed to 
provide a reason why it had rejected her claim. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
the USSR ruled that since the court “in issuing its assessment of the evidence 
presented by the plaintiff, the decision cannot stand.” The Supreme Court also 
ordered that the case must be sent for further review under Article 5 of the 
procedural codes, which stipulates the terms of investigation.125 
Case of Yurii Kopniaev. Yuri Kopniaev was convicted and sentenced on 
March 6, 1959 by the Western Kazakhstan Provincial Court under Article 136 of 
RSFSR Code (intentional killing with base motives) to ten years deprivation of 
freedom.  Yuri had intervened in a fight between his brother and M. Tresikov by 
125 SovetskaiaIustitsiia ,1960,no. 14.28.Ascitedin:JohnNHazard. TheSovietLegalSystem:Post
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striking Tresikov in the back of the head with a large stick. The victim 
subsequently died from the injury.  Upon appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that 
Yuri’s actions did not meet the standards of “intentional killing with base 
motives” especially in the absence of any further aggravating circumstances.  The 
courts convicted Yuri on a lesser charge and he therefore faced a lesser penalty.126 
The Case of Chaplia. During a robbery of his home, Iamchitskii shot 
Chaplia in the hand after he had stabbed Iamchitskii’s wife. Chaplia died in the 
hospital that night from surgical complications.  Iamchitskii was charged and 
convicted of inflicting serious bodily injury exceeding the bounds of self-defense.  
He was sentenced under Article 149 of the Ukrainian SRR Criminal Code to one-
year deprivation of freedom.  The Deputy Procurator General of the USSR 
protested the case on the basis that the court had underestimated the “degree of 
danger” posed by the criminal intruder.  The Prosecutor successfully argued that 
the court had wrongly compared only the “means of defense to the means of 
attack”  (that is, a gun in response to a knife) and not the “reality of the events”.  
The Court overturned the verdict and terminated the sentence. 127 
The Case of Salatov. Salatov was found guilty and convicted of stealing a 
passport, labor book, pension identification and other personal documents, his 
sentence was reduced retroactively as the new RSFSR codes stipulated a far lesser 
punishment for this crime.128 
The Case of Zharkov. Zharkov was convicted and sentenced to a lengthy 
period of imprisonment as an accessory to robbery.  Under the reformed codes 
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that redefined the definition of complicity, Zharkov appealed his conviction.  On 
December 13, 1958, Zharkov simply stood by and watched his friends commit a 
robbery.  According to his peers testimony it was clear that he was neither a part 
of the conspiracy nor had not taken part in the robbery. While still held 
responsible for failure to inform, Zharkov’s lengthy sentence was reduced to one 
year of penal labor.129 
Case of Koletvinov. Koletvinov, who was born on September 13, 1939, was 
convicted under an anti-hooligan law to deprivation of freedom for five years 
starting December 5, 1956 to be followed by internal exile for another two years.  
Under Article 24 of the reformed codes, the penalty of banishment could not be 
applied to person under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the crime.  
Thus Koletvinov, who was only 17 at the time, he was fully released from the 
remainder of his term in 1959 after serving over a third of his sentence, having 
demonstrated exemplary conduct. 130 
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Conclusion 
 
Social contracts existed on various levels of Soviet society.  Elites 
exchanged political orthodoxy for privilege. The middle class exchanged political 
acquiescence for standardized prices and normalized legal codes. The working 
masses exchanged lax working conditions for low pay.131 However, the 
normalized legal codes and procedures of the Khrushchev era extended a social 
contract to the whole society, from elites to peasants.   The Party and state for the 
first time in Russian and Soviet history imposed limits on its policing authority 
and arbitrary use of power.  While the restrictions excluded political deviations, 
the mere fact that the Party limited its authority was a telling enough 
development. 
The history of Russian legality is in many ways the history of collective 
responsibility.  Collective legal conceptions developed out of an organic response 
to a community’s social fabric.   The tension between central and local authorities 
mirrored the rift between Russian elites and the Russian masses.  For the first 
time in Russian history attempted to overcome that rift, via social activism 
witnessed in the reforms of the late fifties and early sixties.  The self-policing of 
the Russian village now found new roots in Soviet society.  In keeping with this 
131
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Russian historical precedent, the community embraced the role of law 
enforcement.  
The cases presented in the final chapter demonstrate a turning point in 
Soviet legal history.  The rights of the accused were honored for the first time, 
and criminal law procedures found more creative ways to adjudicate social 
problems than merely issuing harsh penalties.  At the same time, however, a 
great emphasis on achieving and maintaining social order was evident in the 
spirit of the laws passed.  Indeed, as Vladimir Kozlov points out, by the end of 
1959, the widespread unrest in the Virgin Lands came to an end.132 It seems 
unlikely that the end of the unrest and the institution of the new legal codes was a 
coincidence. This quelling of public disorder took place in at a time when militia 
officers seemed genuinely concerned about how to “restrain hooligans without 
violating their legal rights, which clearly contradicted the spirit of the Post Stalin 
liberal trends.”133 The reform movement, however halting and imperfect, 
represented a paradigm shift in Russian and Soviet justice.  The distance between 
the citizen and the law had been radically reduced; there were numerous ways for 
citizens to be involved in legal proceedings, not to mention numerous guarantees 
of rights.  While exceptions were made for political agitation, it seems the party 
and state struck a implicit deal with the population:  political activism outside the 
party was strictly off limits, but normalized legal codes and an equitable, fair 
justice system could maintain public order far more effectively and benignly than 
a Stalinist police state.  
132
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For historians and political scientists, the Khrushchev legal reforms 
represent more than a quest for social order.  They highlight the frequently 
reactive nature of Party rule and the limits of authority in the Soviet state.  Sadly, 
however, the extent and nature of the Soviet legal liberalization all too often 
reverted to cynicism and arbitrary justice.  In Hungary in 1956 and 
Novocherkassk in 1961 Soviet authorities imposed order through the barrel of a 
tank.  But such examples underscore the threats that Soviet authorities faced.  
From a strictly realpolitik viewpoint, Soviet leaders ruled over a far more hostile 
and potentially explosive population than scholars had previously realized before 
the opening of Soviet era archives. While the Party should not be forgiven for 
failing to develop more democratic institutions, historians and political scientists 
can leave those discussions for the coffee shop.  The means of coercion in the 
Soviet and Russian state and the role of law in the citizen-state relationship are 
still unresolved matters in the current Putin administration.  A more complete 
understanding of Soviet legality, practically, conceptually, and historically gives 
us clues on how to best reform Russian law and the Russian state.     
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